Drew E. Pomerance, Esq., State Bar No. 101239 ROXBOROUGH, POMERANCE & NYE LLP ORIGINAL FILED 1 2 10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, California 90024-4358 APR 24 % Tel: (310) 470-1869 / Fax: (310) 470-9648 3 Mark Goshgarian, Esq., State Bar No. 105703 John A. Marshall, Esq., State Bar No. 109557 GOSHGARIAN & MARSHALL, PLC LOS ANGELES 4 23901 Calabasas Road, Suite 2073 Calabasas, California 91302-1542 Tel: (818) 591-9000 / Fax: (818) 591-0810 APR 2 4 2001 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff, DOUGLAS RYAN, LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 8 an Individual. On Behalf of the General Public 9 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11 12 BC249230 DOUGLAS RYAN, an individual, on behalf) Case No.: 13 of the general public, 14 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND Plaintiff. RESTITUTIONARY RELIEF UNDER BUS. & PROF. CODE §17200, ET AL. TO ENJOIN VIOLATIONS OF 15 VS. INSURANCE CODE §1861.02(c) 16 FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, 17 inclusive. 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff, DOUGLAS RYAN, alleges as follows: Plaintiff, DOUGLAS RYAN, is an individual residing in the County of Los 22 23 Angeles, State of California. As authorized under Business & Professions Code §17204, plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the general public. 24 2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, 25 26 FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, is and at all times mentioned was a corporation engaged in the business of writing automobile insurance and is doing business in the County 27 of Los Angeles, State of California. 28

- 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the defendants named herein as DOES 1-100 participated in some or all of the acts and omissions alleged herein and/or are in some manner legally responsible and liable for the relief sought herein. Plaintiff is presently unaware of the true names and/or capacities of DOES 1-100 and for that reason sues them in said fictitious manner. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege the true names and capacities of DOES 1-100 upon ascertaining that information.
- 4. Plaintiff further alleges that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, whether DOES 1 through 100 or otherwise, were agents, servants and employees of each other, and acting within the course and scope of said agency and employment.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 5. In November 1988, Proposition 103 passed in the State of California and became law, requiring insurance companies to grant insureds a "Good Driver Discount."
- 6. As part of Proposition 103, California *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c) became effective on November 8, 1989, precluding insurance companies from utilizing the absence of prior automobile insurance coverage, in and of itself, as a criterion in determining eligibility for the Good Driver Discount, or generally in the calculation of a person's premiums. A driver is legally entitled to a Good Driver Discount policy if he/she has been licensed to drive a motor vehicle for the previous three years and did not have more than one violation point count within the past three years by engaging in any conduct itemized in *Insurance Code* §1861.025 and *Vehicle Code* §12810.
- 7. In 1999, counsel for Plaintiff discovered that a number of automobile insurance carriers within California have been in violation of Proposition 103 and specifically *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c) by utilizing the absence of prior insurance in and of itself as a criterion in assessing a premium surcharge or in denying a premium discount.
- 8. Under the pretext of attempting to verify an insured's accident or driving record, numerous carriers have instead enacted rating plans which actually target an

individual's lack of prior automobile insurance as a factor in the setting of premiums. Under these plans, the carriers ostensibly seek to obtain written verification of an insured's driving record, but in reality the only acceptable type of driving record verification is evidence of current insurance. Thus, the lack of automobile insurance — in and of itself — determines whether a surcharge will be applied or whether a discount is denied.

- 9. The first lawsuit brought to rectify these violations of *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c) was a class action lawsuit filed against Allstate Insurance Company in a case called *Mitchell v. Allstate*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BC 212492. Simultaneously with the filing of the class action lawsuit, plaintiffs prosecuted a parallel administrative complaint before the Department of Insurance. The *Mitchell* case thus brought to the Department of Insurance's attention the violations of *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c) by a carrier who imposed a surcharge if a customer was unable to present Allstate with "acceptable" written verification of his or her driving record. A true and correct copy of the *Mitchell* class action lawsuit is attached as Exhibit "A", and a true and correct copy of the parallel administrative complaint is attached as Exhibit "B".
- 10. An administrative hearing was held before the DOI on March 14, 2000, where plaintiffs and Allstate presented their arguments to the hearing officer. Following the hearing, the parties requested that the DOI stay any decision pending the parties' attempt to resolve the matter. Thus, the parties engaged in extensive settlement negotiations over the next year, ultimately reaching a settlement whereby Allstate has agreed to discontinue its Non-Verifiable Accident Record Surcharge.
- 11. As a result of the administrative hearing involving Allstate, the DOI issued a "Notice of Proposed Emergency Action Pursuant to California *Insurance Code* §12921.7," on April 9, 2001. A true and correct copy of the Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "C", which essentially provides that insurance carriers can no longer insist that the only acceptable method for an insured to verify his or her accident record is by furnishing evidence of prior insurance.

- 12. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant herein has engaged and/or does engage in a uniform, system-wide, course of conduct which deprives policyholders without prior history of automobile insurance of the benefits of Proposition 103, *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c), and the Good Driver Discount by off-setting all, if not a substantial portion of the anticipated benefits with a "surcharge" and/or "persistency discount." Whether it is called a "surcharge" or a "persistency discount," the impact on insureds is essentially the same. Insureds with a lapse in coverage are denied the benefits and protections intended under Proposition 103 and *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c). Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant implemented the "surcharge" and/or "persistency discount" to circumvent the law proscribing insurance carriers from considering a person's prior insurance coverage as a factor in determining premiums or eligibility for insurance.
- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant applied the aforesaid surcharge and/or persistency discount for each of its policyholders who did not have insurance for 30 consecutive days or more at any time during the three years period prior to purchasing automobile insurance from defendant. Plaintiff alleges that this business practice was in violation of *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c) since it is based on the absence of prior automobile insurance coverage by the insured.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Unfair Business Practices - Bus. & Prof. Code §17200)

- 14. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-13 as though set forth in full.
- 15. By assessing a surcharge and/or denying a persistency discount against insureds who were entitled to receive a Good Driver Discount because of a lapse in coverage during the three year period prior to purchasing automobile insurance, defendant has violated California *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c) and, therefore, has engaged in an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice in violation of *Business & Professions Code* §17200.

- 16. As a proximate result of the aforesaid business practice, defendant has over-charged automobile insurance premiums throughout California greatly in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court, resulting in illicit profits to defendant, at the expense of consumers.
- 17. In light of defendant's unlawful business practice, plaintiff, on behalf of the general public, seeks from this Court a permanent injunction pursuant to *Business & Professions Code* §17203, enjoining defendant from continuing to charge its insureds the surcharge and/or denying them a persistency discount, and from continuing to violate Proposition 103 and *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c).
- 18. Additionally, and as part of the injunctive relief prayed for herein, this Court should also require defendant to disclose to every current policyholder its practice of imposing a surcharge and/or denying a persistency discount in violation of Proposition 103 and *Insurance Code* §1861.02(c), and the effect said business practice has had and continues to have in increasing the policyholder's premiums and/or ability to obtain automobile insurance.
- 19. Plaintiff, also on behalf of the general public, seeks an order of restitution pursuant to *Business & Professions Code* §17203, requiring defendants to disgorge all premiums which rightfully should be returned to their affected policyholders, but which have instead been collected by defendants as a result of their unlawful business practices as pled in this complaint.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

 For equitable relief, including but not limited to, a permanent injunction restraining Defendant from engaging in the unlawful and unfair business practices as pled in this Complaint.

Exhibit A

- 1	Mark Goshgarian, Esq., State Bar No. 105703 John A. Marshall, Esq., State Bar No. 109557 GOSHGARIAN & MARSHALL, Professional Law Corporation 23901 Calabasas Road, Suite 207 CASE ASSIGNED TO CLASS ACTION DEPARTMENT 59 Calabasas, CA 91302-1542 Telephone: (818) 591-9000 FOR TRIAL AS FOLLOWS Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Floyd Mitchell, Graciela Virgin, Margaret Carmona and Virginia Thompson					
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA					
9	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES					
10						
11	FLOYD MITCHELL, GRACIELA) VIRGEN, MARGARET CARMONA and)	CASE NO. B C212492				
12	VIRGINIA THOMPSON,	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR:				
13	Plaintiffs,)	1. BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH				
14	v.	AND FAIR DEALING; AND				
15 16	ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a) Corporation, and DOES 1) through 100, inclusive,	2. UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE				
17	Defendants.)	§17200.				
18)					
19	Plaintiffs, FLOYD MITCHELL, GRACIELA VIRGEN, MARGARET CARMONA					
20	and VIRGINIA THOMPSON, individuals, on Behalf of Themselves and All					
21	Others Similarly Situated, allege against defendants, ALLSTATE					
22	INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive,					
23	as follows:					
24	GENERAL ALLEGATIONS					
25	1. Plaintiff, FLOYD MITCHELL, is an individual residing in the					
26	County of Los Angeles, State of California.					
27	2. Plaintiff, GRACIELA VIRĜEN, is an individual residing i					
28	the County of Los Angeles, State of California HIBIT A					
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

- 5. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that defendant, ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation (hereinafter "ALLSTATE" and/or "defendant"), is at all times herein mentioned was a business enterprise engaged in the business of writing automobile insurance and is doing business in the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
- 6. The true names and capacities of DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, are presently unknown to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs sue said defendants by such fictitious names. When Plaintiffs ascertain the true names and capacities of said defendants, Plaintiffs will ask leave of Court to amend this Complaint by setting forth the true names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on the basis of such information and belief allege, that Defendants DOES 1 through 100 participated is some or all of the acts and omissions alleged herein and ar responsible and liable to Plaintiffs for the damages and other relie sought herein.
- 7. Plaintiffs further allege that at all times herei mentioned, defendants, and each of them, whether DOES 1 through 10 or otherwise, were agents, servants and employees of each other acting at all times relevant hereto within the course and scope c said agency and employment.

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In November 1988, Proposition 103, requiring insurance 8. companies to grant insureds "Good Driver Discounts" passed in the State of California and thereby became law. Subsequent thereto. California Insurance Code section 1861.02 was adopted and became effective on November 8, 1989 which precludes insurance companies from utilizing evidence of a person's prior automobile insurance coverage in determining eligibility for insurance, the Good Driver Discount, or calculating that person's premiums. However, as more particularly described below, ALLSTATE engaged in a uniform and system-wide course of conduct which deprived those policyholders without prior history of automobile insurance of the benefits of Proposition 103 as well as the Good Driver Discount by off-setting all, if not a substantial portion of the discount with a surcharge Called "Rule 39 Surcharge," also known as the "Non-Verifiable Driving Record Surcharge" (hereinafter "Rule 39 Surcharge"). Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that the Rule 3 Surcharge was a policy implemented by ALLSTATE to circumvent the la proscribing insurance carriers from considering a person's prio insurance coverage as a factor in determining premiums or eligibilit for insurance.

9. Plaintiffs are typical members of an ascertainable class c at least 10,000 individuals within the State of California who have purchased automobile insurance from ALLSTATE from April 1996 to the present, who paid the Rule 39 Surcharge in an amount up to 40% c their quoted premium. Due to the large number of potential class members who have been harmed by the concerted actions of ALLSTATI joinder of all potential class members into one action would

impractical if not impossible. Only by bringing this action as a class action can the interests of the Plaintiffs be economically tried before this court. The named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other individuals similarly situated within the State of California. Those individuals for and on whose behalf this action is brought are hereinafter referred to as "class members."

- of the claims of all class members. These representatives, like all class members, purchased automobile insurance from ALLSTATE sometime after November 8, 1989, when California Insurance Code \$1861.02 became effective precluding automobile companies from utilizing the absence of prior automobile coverage, in and of itself, as a criterion for determining eligibility for a Good Driver Discount policy, to determine automobile rates, premiums or insurability. I driver is legally entitled to a Good Driver Discount policy if he/she has been licensed to drive a motor vehicle for the previous three years and did not have more than one violation point count within the past three years by engaging in any conduct itemized in Insurance Code \$1861.025 and Vehicle Code \$12810.
- 11. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based on succinformation and belief allege that ALLSTATE applied the Rule 3 Surcharge for each of its policyholders who did not have insurance for more than 30 consecutive days or more at any time during the three years period prior to purchasing automobile insurance fro ALLSTATE. Plaintiffs allege that this surcharge was in violation of Insurance Code \$1861.02 since the imposition of the surcharge was based on the insured's absence of prior automobile insurance.

coverage. By imposing the Rule 39 Surcharge in violation of Insurance Code \$1861.02, ALLSTATE committed the same breaches violated the same duties of good faith and fair dealing and general engaged in the same wrongful conduct toward all class members including these representative Plaintiffs.

- 12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege the commencing in April 1996, ALLSTATE applied the Rule 39 Surchard against a policyholder's premiums for the maximum of six consecuti 6-month policies, equivalent to three years. Plaintiffs furth allege that the total amount of Rule 39 Surcharge paid by each of t individual class members is believed to be less than \$75,000.00.
- 13. The resolution of all issues of fact and all issues of 1 will be substantially similar, if not identical for all cla members. ALLSTATE's wrongful conduct, as more particularly alleg. below, was system-wide and carried out uniformly with respect to a of its insured policyholders who for any reason, had a consecuti 30-days or more lapse in coverage during the three years prior to t purchase of the insurance.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against ALLSTATE and Does 1 through 100)

- 14. Plaintiffs repeat and allege all of the allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 in this Complaint as though sallegations were set forth in full herein.
- 15. Plaintiffs have purchased automobile insurance f ALLSTATE. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of ALLSTATE's stand automobile insurance policy (hereinafter collectively referred to

- 16. Plaintiff FLOYD MITCHELL ("MITCHELL") has been insured with ALLSTATE from April or May 1996 to the present. Prior to the commencement of this coverage period, Plaintiff MITCHELL had a lapse of coverage of approximately five to six months for which ALLSTATE imposed the Rule 39 Surcharge of \$163.00 ever six months. Plaintiff MITCHELL was therefore forced to pay this surcharge although he had been an ALLSTATE policyholder for automobile and homeowners insurance continuously since 1987, up until the brief lapse in coverage from about December 1995 to April or May 1996.
- 17. Plaintiff GRACIELA VIRGEN ("VIRGEN") has been insured with ALLSTATE from May 14, 1997 to the present. Prior to the commencement of this coverage period, Plaintiff VIRGEN had a lapse of coverage of approximately two years for which ALLSTATE imposed the Rule 3 Surcharge of \$154.00 every six months.
- 18. Plaintiff MARGARET CARMONA ("CARMONA") was insured wit ALLSTATE from March 29, 1997 to May 29, 1998. Prior to the commencement of this coverage period, Plaintiff CARMONA had a laps of coverage of approximately three months for which ALLSTATE impose the Rule 39 Surcharge of \$474.00 every six months. Plaintiff CARMON was therefore forced to pay this surcharge although she had been a ALLSTATE policyholder for automobile and homeowners insurance continuously for approximately ten years prior to her brief lapse coverage.

- 19. Plaintiff VIRGINIA THOMPSON ("THOMPSON") was insured with ALLSTATE beginning on or about October 9, 1997 to the present. Prior to the commencement of this coverage period, Plaintiff THOMPSON had a lapse of coverage of approximately one (1) year for which ALLSTATI imposed the Rule 39 Surcharge of \$70.00 every six months. Plaintiff: THOMPSON was therefore forced to pay this surcharge although she had been an ALLSTATE policyholder for automobile insurance and 20° Century Insurance Company continuously since approximately Octobe 1988, but for the brief lapse in coverage between October 1996 an October 1997.
- 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the POLICY CONTRACT is a contract of adhesion insofar as it is standard pre-printed form which has been in use by ALLSTATE durin the relevant time period to the present. Plaintiffs further allege that the POLICY CONTRACT was prepared and drafted by ALLSTATE for us with all of its insureds, including all class members, that ALLSTAT is a party of superior bargaining strength and that the POLIC CONTRACT does not contain any terms negotiated at arms length by the parties, nor does it contain any of the promises made by ALLSTATE to induce its insureds to purchase the POLICY CONTRACT, nor explanation of the Rule 39 Surcharge.
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege the regardless of whether the Plaintiffs qualified for the Good Driv Discount, they were forced to pay higher premiums because of the imposition of Rule 39 Surcharge which increased the amount premiums approximately 30% to 40%. Plaintiffs are also informed a believe and thereon allege that the Rule 39 Surcharge is imposed the insureds' premiums for six consecutive 6-month periods unless to

- 23. Plaintiffs further allege that on May 20, 1998 and May 2 1998, the depositions of ALLSTATE's sales agents, Malcolm Brown a John Lenczewski were taken in a certain action entitled, K Letourneau v. Allstate Insurance Company, et al., Los Angel Superior Court Case No. BC 145897 (the "Ken Letourneau Action wherein Messrs. Brown and Lenczewski testified that ALLSTATE'S Ru 39 Surcharge was essentially a surcharge for those insureds withour prior insurance and surcharge was a way ALLSTATE attempts to c around Proposition 103. A true and correct copy of the relevator portions of the depositions of Malcolm Brown and John Lenczewski attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
- 24. In the Ken Letourneau Action, an independent finding a made by the California Department of Insurance (hereinafter "DO that ALLSTATE violated the Insurance Code by pressuring its age not to sell insurance to persons without evidence of prior insuran The DOI stated in its order:

"While Allstate counters that its "incentive" and "productivity improvement" programs carried no impact with

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respect to an agent's income and held no negative impact on an agent's advancement, the testimony and document presented in this matter demonstrate that Allstate, through use of its "incentive" and/or "productivity improvement" programs, in fact, clearly indicated to its agents that the writing of "no prior" business was undesirable.

The Department finds that this practice, even if, arguendo, there was no consequent punitive impact on the agent, had the effect of pressuring agents to avoid writing applicants with no evidence of prior insurance in violation of CIC \$1855.02(c)." (emphasis in original) (See Exhibit "C" hereto)

25. ALLSTATE filed a Writ of Mandate with the San Francisco Superior Court seeking a reversal of the DOI ruling in the Kelletourneau Action. However, on January 26, 1998, after reviewing the entire administrative record on the merits, the San Francisco Superior Court upheld the DOI's findings by specially ruling that:

"This Court finds, based on the record before it, that Allstate used `no priors' as a criterion for determining whether or not to insure an individual. Using `no priors' to determine insurability is expressly prohibited by the statute. The Court also finds that the frequency with `no prior' was mentioned as a poor/worst risk, and the weight it was given in documents,

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in relation to other poor risk criteria, establishes to the Court's satisfaction that evidence of an individual's `no prior' status was used `in and of itself' to determine insurability."

(Exhibit "D," pg. 3 line 25; pg. 4, line 6)

- Furthermore, on May 21, 1998, the Los Angeles Superior Court in the Ken Letourneau Action granted a motion for summary adjudication and thereby ruled as a matter of law that ALLSTATE's conduct in pressuring its agent not to sell and/or to discourage sales of insurance to those without prior insurance violated 103 and Insurance Code §1861.02 Proposition and therefore, constituted an unfair business practice in violation of Business & Professions Code \$17200. Based on this finding, the Hon. Enrique Romero, on May 21, 1998, also issued a preliminary injunction. enjoining ALLSTATE from using a person's absence of automobile insurance coverage to determine insurability or to calculate the person's premiums. (See Judge Romero's ruling granting Motion for Summary Adjudication and Preliminary Injunction collectively attached hereto as Exhibit "E").
 - 27. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based on such information and belief allege that despite this injunction and indirect violation of the injunction, ALLSTATE continues to impose the Rule 39 Surcharge which uses a person's absence of automobil insurance coverage to determine the amount of the premiums that person will pay.
 - 28. Plaintiffs have paid all premiums due under the POLIC CONTRACT and have performed all obligations under the POLICY CONTRAC on their parts to be performed, except for those payments under the policy contracts the payments under the payments under the policy contracts the payments under the policy contracts the payments under the pa

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- 29. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, and on such information and belief allege, that ALLSTATE's Rule 39 Surcharge is capricious, arbitrary, unreasonable and designed solely to circumvent Proposition 103 and *Insurance Code* \$1861.02.
- 30. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that thereon allege that ALLSTATE's conduct as described above constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing which ALLSTATE owes to Plaintiffs in that ALLSTATE has unreasonably deprived Plaintiffs of the benefits of the POLICY CONTRACT and the provisions of Proposition 103, and has placed Plaintiffs in a worse position than when they were first insured with ALLSTATE, in order that ALLSTATE may increase its own wealth and power in the industry. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the conduct of ALLSTATE and DOES 1 through 100, as described herein above, was intentional and purposefully done so that ALLSTATE could extract higher premiums from Plaintiffs and make automobile insurance more expensive for a certain portion of the population. Plaintiffs are also informed and believe and thereon allege that Rule 39 Surcharge was implemented so that ALLSTATE could increase its own financial position while at the same time impairing the financial interests of Plaintiffs and other class members, then, now and in the future.
- 31. As a proximate result of the conduct of ALLSTATE and DOE:

 1 through 100, as described herein above, Plaintiffs and all othe
 class members similarly situated, have suffered general and specia
 damages including, but not limited to, having to pay the Rule 3
 Surcharge to ALLSTATE every six month policy period up to three year

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- 32. Plaintiffs further allege that the conduct of ALLSTATE and DOES 1 through 100 has been malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, and, has been carried out with an intent to injure and cause harm to Plaintiffs and to harass, vex and annoy Plaintiffs. allege that the facts alleged herein in demonstrate that the conduct of ALLSTATE and DOES 1 through 100 is despicable conduct as defined in the California Code of Civil Procedure § 3294. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish or to set an example of defendants, and each of Plaintiffs further allege that ALLSTATE at all times had them. actual and advance notice of the conduct its officers, directors and employees (DOES 1 through 100) and of the injuries being done to Plaintiffs, and that ALLSTATE approved, ordered, instructed, supervised and controlled the conduct of DOES 1 through 100 such as to constitute a ratification of the conduct of said officers. directors and employees. Accordingly, pursuant to the Doctrine o Respondeat Superior, both ALLSTATE and DOES 1 through 100 are liabl for punitive damages as prayed for herein.
- 33. Plaintiffs further allege that they had to retain attorney and other expert consultants in order to obtain the benefits due the under both the POLICY CONTRACT and Proposition 103. Under the Branc v. Superior Court doctrine, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover a

34. Plaintiffs further allege that ALLSTATE is continuing to engage in the conduct as described above, and specifically continues to charge the Rule 39 Surcharge causing its insureds' premiums to be higher than those who did not have a lapse in coverage during the three year period prior to their purchase of insurance through ALLSTATE, and unless prohibited by this court from doing so, will continue to charge the insureds the Rule 39 Surcharge and cause damages to ALLSTATE's insureds.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Unfair Business Practices Against ALLSTATE and DOES 1-10)

- 35. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every paragraph of the General Allegations as if fully set forth herein.
- 36. In assessing to the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, a Rule 39 Surcharge for a lapse in coverage during a three year period prior to purchasing automobile insurance, ALLSTATE has violated California Insurance Code \$1861.02 and therefore, has engaged in an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice in violation of Business & Professions Code \$17200. The Hon. Enrique Romero in the Ken Letourneau Action specifically ruled that ALLSTATE engaged in an Unfair Business Practices in violation of Business & Professions Code \$17200 by violating Proposition 103 and Insurance Code \$1861.02 when it pressured its agents not to sell insurance to those individuals without prior coverage. (See Exh. "E") And, Judg Romero also issued a preliminary injunction enjoining ALLSTATE fro using the absence of prior insurance as a factor in calculating person's premiums or determining a person's insurability. (See Exh

- 37. As a proximate result of ALLSTATE's implementation of the Rule 39 Surcharge to Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, ALLSTATE has over-charged automobile insurance premiums throughout California greatly in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court, resulting in illicit profits to ALLSTATE. These illicit profits rightfully belong to those policyholders of ALLSTATE who were surcharged based on Rule 39 and should be returned to them.
- 38. In light of ALLSTATE's unfair business practices in violation of the law and an injunction issued by the Los Angeles Superior Court, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the general. public pursuant to Business & Professions Code \$17204, seek from this Court a permanent injunction, enjoining ALLSTATE from continuing to charge its insureds the Rule 39 Surcharge also known as the Non-Verifiable Driving Record Surcharge. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the general public pursuant to Business & Profession Code \$17204, also request that pursuant to Business & Profession Code \$17203, this Court order restitution through disgorgement of ALLSTATE's illicit profits which rightfully belong to it policyholders throughout the state of California.
- 39. Additionally, and as part of the injunctive relief praye for in paragraph 36 above, this Court should also require ALLSTATE t disclose to every current policyholder whose policy periods fal within the relevant time period and were surcharged the Rule 3 Surcharge, its practice of imposing a surcharge in violation of

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray fro judgment against defendants, and each of them, as follows:

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

- 1. For the general and special damages all in a sum according to proof at the time of trial;
- 2. For punitive and exemplary damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of ALLSTATE and DOES 1 through 100;
- 3. For a reasonable amount of attorneys', consultants and experts' fees in accordance with Brandt v. Superior Court incurred by the Plaintiffs hereinafter in connection with this action;
- 4. For equitable relief as determined by this Court, included but not limited to, a permanent injunction restraining ALLSTATE from engaging in the unlawful and unfair business practices as pled in this complaint; restitution to ALLSTATE's policyholders, in the form of an order requiring ALLSTATE to disgorge the profits it obtained by engaging in the conduct which violates Business & Professions Code \$17200 et seq.
- 5. Additionally, for an order requiring ALLSTATE to disclose to all existing and potential policyholders its practice of surcharging those with a gap of insurance coverage, and its effect of an insured's premiums and insurability.

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1	ON ALL CAUSES OF ACTION								
2	6. For all costs incurred by Plaintiffs to date and to be								
3	incurred by Plaintiffs hereafter in connection with this action; and								
4	7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just								
5	and proper.								
6	DATED: June 18, 1999 Respectfully submitted,								
7	GOSHGARIAN & MARSHALL, PLC								
8	2111.								
9	By:								

Exhibit B

GOSHGARIAN & MARSHALL

Mark Goshgarian John A. Marshall Merak Eskigian Melissa E. Hargiss Professional Law Corporation 23901 Calabasas Road, Suite 2073 Calabasas, California 91302-1542 Telephone (818) 591-9000 Fax (818) 591-0810

Of Counsel Haig Goshgarian

July 1, 1999

Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush Department of Insurance 300 Capitol Mall, Suite 1500 Sacramento, CA 95814-4339

BY FEDERAL EXPRESS

Re: Floyd Mitchell, et al. vs. Allstate Insurance Company

Dear Commissioner Quackenbush:

Please be advised that my office has filed a Class Action Complaint on behalf of the above entitled Class Plaintiffs. Enclosed for your file is a conformed copy of the Complaint that is presently pending in Los Angeles Superior Court, LASC Case No. BC212492, before Honorable Bruce Mitchell.

This letter shall serve as Plaintiffs formal request that the Commissioner's office take jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the holding in Farmers Insurance Exchange vs. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 377, 6 Cal.Rptr 487 (1992), which holds that the primary jurisdiction doctrine requires that the plaintiffs in these types of cases first exhaust administrative remedies prior to resort to Additionally, this letter shall serve as a formal the courts. Complaint pursuant to the provisions of Insurance Code S's 1858 and 12921.4 which include, but are not limited to, Allstate's misconduct, Allstate's improper rates being charged insureds, Allstate's improper rating plan, Allstate's improper rating system and Allstate's improper underwriting rules. Finally, please be advised that the Complainant's herein request a public hearing before the commissioner, as well as private hearing before the hearing officers to be assigned to this matter.

The underlying Class Action lawsuit alleges that Allstate engaged in a uniform and system-wide course of conduct which deprived those policyholders without prior history of automobile insurance of the benefits of Proposition 103 as well as the Good Driver Discount by offsetting all, if not a substantial portion, of the discount with a surcharge also known as "Rule 39" or the "Non-Verifiable Driving Record Surcharge". The factual allegations of Allstate's misconduct as alleged by Complainants are contained in the Class Action Complaint which is enclosed herein and incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth.

EXHIBIT_B___

Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush Department of Insurance June 30, 1999 Page 2

Furthermore, as you may be aware a prior similar Complaint was filed with the DOI on behalf of some the same Class Plaintiffs which was subsequently withdrawn by the Complainants attorneys. It is my understanding that this prior Compliant was withdrawn prior to any findings being made by the DOI with respect to the Class issues. However, it is my understanding that the DOI made findings against Allstate on these same identical legal issues in the case entitled Letourneau v. Allstate wherein the DOI made specific findings that Allstate's use of absence of automobile insurance as a justification for imposing a surcharge was in violation of Proposition 103. The Insurance Commissioner's finding in the Letourneau v. Allstate matter is dated July 3, 1997, and is attached hereto for your convenience.

The attorneys that handled these prior Complaints for the DOI are Brian Soublet, Natasha R. Ray, and Leslie E. Tick.

Please respond in writing whether or not the DOI will take jurisdiction over this matter. If not, please provide me with the equivalent of a "right to sue" letter. If the DOI intends to exercise jurisdiction, please provide the undersigned with a time table as to when the proceedings authorized by the law shall occur.

I look forward to receiving the DOI's official acknowledgment of this matter. If you should have any questions or comments, or are in need of additional information, don't hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

MARK GOSHGARIĂN

MG/nn

cc: Clients

Brian Soublet, General Counsel Natasha R. Ray, Staff Counsel Leslie E. Tick, Staff Counsel

Dean Hansell, Esq. (Attorney for Allstate Insurance Company)

Exhibit C

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

Legal Division, Rate Enforcement Bureau 45 Fremont Street, 21st Floor San Prancisco, CA 94105

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NOTICE OF PROPOSED EMERGENCY ACTION PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE SECTION 12921.7.

File No. ER-41

April 9, 2001

Verifiable Driving Record

California Insurance Commissioner Harry W. Low hereby provides notice, pursuant to California Insurance Code Section 12921.7, that he will propose to the Office of Administrative Law the amendment of Title 10, Chapter 5, Subchapter 4.7, Article 4, Section 2632.13 of the California Code of Regulations on an emergency basis pursuant to California Government Code Section 11346.1(b).

This Notice contains a description of the problem and the necessity for regulation, an explanation of the justification for the adoption of the regulation on an emergency basis and a copy of the proposed regulation.

This Notice is provided to every person, group, and association who has previously filed a request for notice of regulatory action with the Commissioner. Copies of the Notice are available at the Department of Insurance, 45 Fremont Street, 21st Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105.

The proposed regulation will be submitted to the Office of Administrative Law together with the rulemaking file not less than five (5) working days after the mailing of this Notice, as required by California Insurance Code Section 12921.7. Questions regarding this Notice should be directed to:

California Department of Insurance Legal Division, Rate Enforcement Bureau Attn: Elizabeth Mohr 45 Fremont Street, 21st Floor San Francisco, California 94105 (415) 538-4112

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM AND NECESSITY FOR REGULATION

California Insurance Code Section 1861.02(c) provides that "[t]he absence of prior automobile insurance coverage, in and of itself, shall not be a criterion for determining eligibility for a Good Driver Discount policy, or generally for automobile rates, premiums, or insurability." However, under California Insurance Code Section 1861.02(a), an insurer must base rates on a policyholder's driving safety record. Accident information provided by a prior insurer is one



way to verify an applicant's driving safety record. But this information could potentially be used, in effect, to impose a prior insurance requirement on new insurance applicants.

Nothing in the California Insurance Code or the Department's regulations currently prohibit insurers from seeking verifiable accident or loss information. In fact, Title 10, California Code of Regulations, Section 2632.5(c)(1) defines driving safety record as the public record of traffic violation convictions and principally at-fault accidents determined in accordance with Section 2632.13. Sections 2632.13(f) and (g) permit insurers to investigate whether a driver was principally at fault in an accident, including seeking that information from another insurer.

However, insurers have begun to use these and other provisions in ways that arguably impose a "prior insurance" requirement on new applicants. For example, some insurers require that applicants provide written documentation from the applicant's current insurer regarding prior accident history or a renewal offer from the applicant's current insurer indicating accident record experience. Insurers have required applicants to have previously been insured with a subscribing loss underwriting exchange carrier, e.g., C.L.U.E.

Although insurers have permitted applicants other ways to verify their prior accident history, these options are not realistically available for most applicants. Other available options typically have included:

- Written documentation from a military commanding officer that the applicant was stationed overseas and was not principally at fault in an accident.
- Written documentation from the applicant's supervisor in the Peace Corps, Foreign Service, or similar organization that the applicant was not principally at fault in an accident.
- Written documentation that the applicant did not own or have regular access to a vehicle.
- Written medical documentation that the applicant did not operate a vehicle.
- Written documentation from the applicant's employer that the applicant was furnished a company car for business and personal use and was not principally at fault in an accident.
- Some insurers specifically prohibited use of Motor Vehicle Records to verify accident record.

As a result, the "verifiable driving record" requirements appear to have been used to require proof of prior insurance in violation of California Insurance Code Section 1861.02(c).

JUSTIFICATION FOR ADOPTION AS EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

Because some insurers are currently requiring verifiable driving record information from another insurer, consumers who lack prior insurance and seek coverage from one of those insurers do not receive the protections sought to be afforded by the voters when they enacted California Insurance Code Section 1861.02(c) as part of Proposition 103. Additionally, insurers not

requiring accident information from a prior insurer claim that they are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis insurers imposing such requirements. Adoption of this regulatory language on an emergency basis will prevent these inequities. Additionally, because insurers require time to reprogram computers, rewrite rating manuals, distribute information to their producers and/or sales force, and make the appropriate filings with the California Department of Insurance, adoption of this regulatory provision on an emergency basis is the only way to ensure timely compliance with Insurance Code Section 1861.02(c).

The Insurance Commissioner proposes the adoption of this rulemaking action pursuant to the authority vested in him by California Insurance Code Section 1861.02(e). The purpose of this rulemaking action is to implement, interpret, and make specific the provisions of California Insurance Code Sections 1861.02 and 1861.025.

TEXT OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION.

The text of the proposed rulemaking is attached.

Dated: April 9, 2001

HARRY W. LOW Insurance Commissioner

By: CUZALETH A. MOHR
Assistant Chief Counsel

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

Legal Division, Rate Enforcement Bureau 45 Fremont Street, 21st Floor San Francisco, CA 94105



ER-41

April 9, 2001

Title 10, California Code of Regulations, Section 2632.13 is proposed for amendment as follows1

2632.13. Eligibility to Purchase Good Driver Discount Policy and Guidelines for Determination of "Principally At-Fault."

(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, in determining an applicant's atfault accident history, an insurer shall accept the applicant's declaration, under penalty of
perjury, attesting to his or her at-fault accident history. If an insurer later discovers that the
declaration contains a fraudulent or material misrepresentation, the insurer may cancel the policy
pursuant to California Insurance Code sections 661 and 1861.03(c)(1) and take any other action
authorized by law. Nothing in this subdivision shall prevent an insurer from using information
available from the public record of traffic violation convictions as set forth in section

2632.5(c)(1)(A), principally at-fault accidents as set forth in this section, or information from a
subscribing loss underwriting exchange carrier.

Within 45 days of the effective date of this subsection, each insurer writing private passenger automobile insurance shall file, with the Department's Rate Filing Bureau, evidence demonstrating its compliance with this subsection.

(i) [current subsection (i) becomes subsection (j)].

NOTE: Authority cited: Sections 1861.02, 1861.025, 12921 and 12926, Insurance Code; CalFarm Insurance Company v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.3d 805 (1989). Reference: Sections 488.5, 1861.02 and 1861.025, Insurance Code; Section 12810, Vehicle Code.

¹ New language is underlined.