Thursday, January 28, 2010

STRAWN v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF OREGON

STRAWN v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF OREGON

MARK STRAWN, on his own behalf and as representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF OREGON, an Oregon stock insurance company; MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation; and TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellants, and
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant.

990809080, A131605.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Filed: January 27, 2010.

Richard S. Yugler and Landye Bennett Blumstein LLP for petition and supplemental petition. With them on the reply was David N. Goulder.

James N. Westwood, P.K. Runkles-Pearson, and Stoel Rives LLP for response.

Before WOLLHEIM, Presiding Judge, and BREWER, Chief Judge,[ 1 ] and SERCOMBE, Judge.

SERCOMBE, J.

Petitions for attorney fees allowed in amount of $595,647.

SERCOMBE, J.

In Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co., 228 Or App 454, 457, 209 P3d 357, rev allowed, 347 Or 258 (2009) (Strawn II), defendants Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, Mid-Century Insurance Company, and Truck Insurance Exchange (collectively "Farmers") appealed a class action judgment awarding plaintiffs $898,323.80 in compensatory damages and prejudgment interest, $8 million in punitive damages, and more than $2.6 million in attorney fees, and a supplemental judgment awarding plaintiffs additional attorney fees. On appeal, we vacated both judgments with instructions to grant Farmers' motion for a new trial limited to punitive damages, unless plaintiffs agreed to remittitur of punitive damages to four times their compensatory damages and prejudgment interest. Otherwise, we affirmed. Id. at 488. Plaintiffs, who prevailed on appeal, now petition for attorney fees arising from and related to Strawn II and request that we make findings pursuant to ORAP 13.10(7) in support of our decision.

For the reasons explained below, we allow plaintiffs' petitions for attorney fees in part and order an attorney fee award of $542,469 for plaintiffs' "fee-shifting" claims under ORS 742.061(1), an attorney fee award of $41,136 for the common fund claims portion of the appeal, and an attorney fee award of $12,042 for plaintiffs' time litigating their initial attorney fee petition.[ 2 ] We deny plaintiffs' request for an additional incentive award to class representative Strawn.

Plaintiffs' class action claims arose out of Farmers' claims handling process with respect to the payment of personal injury protection benefits to its insureds. Plaintiffs brought claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and declaratory relief. The first three of those claims were tried to a jury. The jury found in plaintiffs' favor and awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages and prejudgment interest and $8 million in punitive damages on the fraud claim. The court granted declaratory relief. After a post-verdict claims administration process, the judgments noted above were entered. Strawn II, 228 Or App at 457.

On appeal, Farmers raised eight assignments of error "spanning nearly every stage of the case—from the court's order granting class certification, through trial and post-verdict proceedings, to the award of attorney fees." Id. at 461-62. We affirmed in all respects except for the amount of the punitive damages award. We concluded that" a punitive damages award that is four times plaintiffs' actual or potential harm is all that due process will bear." Id. at 485. Accordingly, we vacated the judgment for punitive damages with instructions to grant Farmers' motion for a new trial on punitive damages, unless plaintiffs were to agree to remittitur of punitive damages to four times their compensatory damages and prejudgment interest. Id.

Thus, plaintiffs successfully defended the parts of the judgments relating to their contractual claims, the fraud claim, and a portion of the punitive damages. As noted above, plaintiffs rely on two different bases for an allowance of attorney fees on appeal, depending on whether the fees were incurred to defend the judgment on the contractual claims or to defend the parts of the judgment that pertained to the fraud claim and the punitive damages award. Plaintiffs rely on ORS 742.061 for a fee-shifting award arising from their contractual claims against Farmers;[ 3 ] they rely on the equitable common fund doctrine for an award to compensate class counsel for defending the verdict on their fraud claim and punitive damages recovery on appeal; they also depend on the common fund doctrine in support of their request for an incentive award for Strawn, the class representative. Lastly, plaintiffs petition for supplemental attorney fees for the time and effort they have spent seeking their fees on appeal.[ 4 ]

"[W]hen an attorney fees petition comports with the requirements of ORAP 13.10(5), * * * our inquiry into the request generally will be limited to the objections that are filed by the party opposing the petition." Kahn v. Canfield, 330 Or 10, 13-14, 998 P2d 651 (2000); see also Dockins v. State Farm Ins. Co., 330 Or 1, 6, 997 P2d 859 (2000) (Dockins II). Here, Farmers objects to both petitions for attorney fees on various grounds. Although Farmers does not object to plaintiffs' entitlement to some award of attorney fees under ORS 742.061(1), it argues that the amount of fees that plaintiffs initially requested is unreasonable. Farmers likewise contends that the amount of fees requested in the supplemental petition is unreasonable. Lastly, Farmers asserts that plaintiffs are not entitled to any award of attorney fees as compensation for work done in defense of the verdict on plaintiffs' fraud claim and the punitive damages recovery or as an incentive award for the class representative.

I. FEE SHIFTING AWARD
In their initial petition for attorney fees, plaintiffs seek $1,065,560 for their fee shifting claims under ORS 742.061(1), itemized as $969,256.80 in fees and $96,303.38 in costs and expenses. Plaintiffs' itemized fee request results from (1) the determination of the total number hours spent on plaintiffs' appeal and the multiplication of those hours by class counsel's hourly rates, resulting in a" lodestar" amount of fees; (2) the allocation of hours to distinguish time spent on plaintiffs' fee-shifting claims from time spent defending plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim and punitive damages recovery, and a reduction of the lodestar based on that allocation; (3) the application of a fee enhancement or multiplier to that reduced lodestar; and (4) a request for costs and expenses not included in that reduced lodestar. We begin our analysis of plaintiffs' fee-shifting request by noting the standard that applies to such an award. We then address each of the four steps in plaintiffs' calculation method, taking into consideration Farmers' objections.

A. Standard
ORS 742.061(1) provides for an award of a "reasonable amount" of attorney fees for work done on appeal in an action" upon any policy of insurance." In determining a reasonable attorney fee award under ORS 742.061, we consider the factors enumerated in ORS 20.075. See also Dockins II, 330 Or at 5-6 (citing those same factors as stated in DR 2-106). ORS 20.075 provides:

"(1) A court shall consider the following factors in determining whether to award attorney fees in any case in which an award of attorney fees is authorized by statute and in which the court has discretion to decide whether to award attorney fees:
"(a) The conduct of the parties in the transactions or occurrences that gave rise to the litigation, including any conduct of a party that was reckless, willful, malicious, in bad faith or illegal.
"(b) The objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties.
"(c) The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter others from asserting good faith claims or defenses in similar cases.
"(d) The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter others from asserting meritless claims and defenses.
"(e) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties and their attorneys during the proceedings.
"(f) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties in pursuing settlement of the dispute.
"(g) The amount that the court has awarded as a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190.
"(h) Such other factors as the court may consider appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
"(2) A court shall consider the factors specified in subsection (1) of this section in determining the amount of an award of attorney fees in any case in which an award of attorney fees is authorized or required by statute. In addition, the court shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of an award of attorney fees in those cases:
"(a) The time and labor required in the proceeding, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to properly perform the legal services.
"(b) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment by the attorney would preclude the attorney from taking other cases.
"(c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
"(d) The amount involved in the controversy and the results obtained.
"(e) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances of the case.
"(f) The nature and length of the attorney's professional relationship with the client.
"(g) The experience, reputation and ability of the attorney performing the services.
"(h) Whether the fee of the attorney is fixed or contingent."
We do not find that the factors set out in ORS 20.075(1) affect the amount of the fee-shifting award. The criteria in ORS 20.075(2), however, are material, and we now turn to the application of those factors.

B. Reasonableness of Total Hours
Plaintiffs assert that the time spent by class counsel on plaintiffs' appeal was reasonable, and plaintiffs have submitted declarations by class counsel and an outside expert in support of that assertion. Plaintiffs base their fee-shifting request on 1,537 hours of appellate time and 94.4 hours of class administration time. Included within plaintiffs' 1,537 hours of appellate time are 61.55 hours that arose from and relate to a prior appeal initiated by Farmers that occurred during the course of this litigation. See Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co., 195 Or App 679, 98 P2d 1158 (2004) (Strawn I). The 94.4 hours of class administration time represent time that plaintiffs assert counsel spent working on certain post-judgment proceedings in the trial court, communications with class members after November 23, 2005, and expenses for claims administration after December 9, 2005, necessary to the pendency of the appeal.

Farmers objects to the total number of hours spent by class counsel on appeal as excessive because the appeal involved the preparation of only a single brief and oral argument and class counsel's hours included duplicative work.Farmers argues, based on the submitted declaration of an outside expert, that class counsel's total appellate hours should be reduced to, at most, 700 hours of appellate time. Furthermore, Farmers argues that, in any event, we should refuse plaintiffs' request for fees related to Strawn I, where Farmers was designated as the prevailing party and no costs were allowed.

Plaintiffs respond that their overall time is reasonable given (1) the procedural and substantive complexity of the underlying case and the appeal and (2) the approach undertaken by Farmers on appeal. Plaintiffs note that, on appeal, Farmers had advanced eight assignments of error spanning nearly every stage of the case, it combined assignments of error that should have been separately stated, and it raised issues that it had failed to preserve. See Strawn II, 228 Or App at 461-62, 466-69, 473-75. Finally, plaintiffs reassert that time related to Strawn I is properly part of their recovery.

We agree with Farmers that the overall amount of time plaintiffs seek for litigating the appeal is excessive. Farmers has made a sufficient showing that the amount of time plaintiffs expended in this case lies outside the reasonable range for an appeal, even for a complex class action of this magnitude. We conclude that some of the time spent on preparation of the appellate brief was excessive and reduce the fees in the amount of $64,500. We also reduce plaintiffs' appellate time to eliminate the 61.55 hours that plaintiffs spent on Strawn I. Plaintiffs may only recover the fees incurred in Strawn II, where they are the prevailing party and are entitled to costs; they may not now recover the fees incurred in Strawn I, where they were not the prevailing party and were not entitled to costs. In addition, we deny plaintiffs' request for fees attributable to the 94.4 hours of class administration time. The class must instead seek a supplemental judgment in the trial court for that time. We calculate the value of plaintiffs' attorney fees on the appeal to be $373,966.

C. Allocation of Hours to Fee-Shifting Claims
Plaintiffs have made an allocation to distinguish the hours that class counsel spent on an action "upon any policy of insurance" under ORS 742.061(1)—i.e., the hours spent on their fee-shifting claims—from the hours incurred solely in connection with their claim for common-law fraud and punitive damages recovery. Plaintiffs contend that roughly 11 percent of their time was spent defending their verdict on the fraud claim and their punitive damages recovery.

Farmers objects to the allocation as made by plaintiffs and argues that 20 percent of plaintiffs' appellate time should be allocated to the nonfee-shifting claims. One of Farmers' experts contends that the allocation made by plaintiffs was unreasonable, in part, because the work necessary to defend the verdict on the fraud claim and punitive damages recovery was substantial, as demonstrated by the amount of briefing provided on those matters by plaintiffs. Farmers also contends that, in addition to the hours devoted to the fraud claim and punitive damages recovery, the hours that class counsel spent on the assignment of error concerning the mootness of the declaratory judgment claim is also not compensable under ORS 742.061(1). With respect to the declaratory judgment claim, Farmers asserts that (1) the work class counsel "performed on appeal [was] essentially procedural and so far removed from the direct object of obtaining a money judgment," as required under McGraw v. Gwinner, 282 Or 393, 578 P2d 1250 (1978), and (2) the work was unique and not duplicative of any work that advanced the actual fee-shifting claims.

In response, plaintiffs contend that Farmers' expert inflated the amount of briefing time required on the fraud claim and punitive damages recovery. In addition, plaintiffs assert that the assignment of error regarding punitive damages was one of the most straightforward assignments to respond to because the principal cases were well known, the factors to be considered were established, and one of plaintiffs' attorneys was active in participating in many recent punitive damages cases in Oregon. Thus, plaintiffs argue that despite the magnitude of the punitive damages recovery, the 11 percent allocation is reasonable. As to Farmers' objection to the inclusion of time spent on the declaratory judgment claim, plaintiffs respond that Farmers made no such argument below and that the trial court's attorney fee award included time spent on the declaratory judgment claim. Plaintiffs also assert that McGraw is inapposite.

We agree with plaintiffs that an allocation of 11 percent of plaintiffs' attorneys' time to the fraud claim and punitive damages recovery is reasonable. We also conclude that the declaratory judgment claim was related to the contractual claim and that the attorney time incurred regarding that claim was compensable under ORS 742.061. Our conclusion on the allocation issue results from the broad range of complex legal issues presented in the appeal related to the class action and the contractual claim and the relatively narrow legal issues presented with respect to the fraud claim and punitive damages recovery. The size of the respective claims does not drive the amount of legal effort necessary for their defense on appeal. Accordingly, we will allocate 11 percent of plaintiffs' appellate time—a value of $41,136—to plaintiffs' nonfee-shifting claims. Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to recover $332,830 in fees under ORS 742.061.

D. Fee Enhancement
Plaintiffs seek a fee enhancement for the services rendered by class counsel on appeal by a factor of 2.25. Plaintiffs argue that a substantial fee enhancement is reasonable given (1) the high risk and contingent nature of the case; (2) the time and effort involved; (3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the magnitude, complexity, and uniqueness of the litigation; and (4) the results achieved. They note that a factor of 2.25 was used by the trial court to enhance their award of attorney fees for services rendered at trial—an award we affirmed in Strawn II.

Farmers objects to the use of a multiplier and argues that, pursuant ORS 742.061(1), plaintiffs are entitled on appeal only to a "reasonable" fee and not the "astronomical" fees that they have requested. Farmers asserts that Oregon courts have rejected the federal lodestar and multiplier approach requested by plaintiffs. One of Farmers' experts recognizes, however, that Oregon law does support compensating counsel who take on contingent fee cases at rates exceeding their standard billing rates. Farmers' expert nonetheless contends that Oregon courts have not used that proposition as a springboard to apply a "multiplier." Despite that contention, Farmers' expert also notes that in Strunk v. PERB, 343 Or 226, 169 P3d 1242 (2007) (Strunk III), the court did apply a multiplier to calculate the fee award. Farmers' expert distinguishes Strunk III on the ground that that case involved the common fund doctrine and not a fee-9shifting statute as the basis for an award of appellate fees. Farmers' expert states that an enhancement of plaintiffs' fees is not appropriate because (1) the need to incentivize plaintiffs' counsel on appeal was less; (2) the complexity of the case was compensated by the staffing choices and hours spent by class counsel on the appeal; and (3) the risk that class counsel faced on appeal was less than the risk that they faced initially at trial. Farmers suggests that if an enhancement is allowed on the appellate fee award, it should be less than the enhancement allowed on the fees at trial.

In response, plaintiffs assert that the term "reasonable" in ORS 742.061 does not preclude the use of a multiplier or other fee enhancement. They argue that enhanced fees are available, whether reached by application of a lodestar and multiplier approach or through the increase of standard hourly rates to "reasonable rates" based on market rates and an enhancement for contingent risks. They assert that the approval of multipliers in Strunk III is not restricted to common fund cases and refer us to the award of fees, which included a multiplier, in Dockins II. Further, they argue that enhancement remains appropriate here because the case remained a" no offer" case throughout the pendency of the appeal, and, therefore, the risks remained the same on appeal.

In light of the issues framed by the parties, we first determine whether we are precluded from using a multiplier or other fee enhancement in determining plaintiffs' fee-shifting award for appellate work. If we are not so precluded, we must then determine whether application of a multiplier or enhancement is appropriate in this case. Lastly, if use of a multiplier or enhancement is appropriate, we must determine what that multiplier or enhancement should be. We begin by examining the cases relied on by the parties.

In Wattenbarger v. Boise Cascade Corp., 301 Or 12, 16, 717 P2d 1175 (1986), the claimant argued that the court should recognize that the contingent nature of attorney fees in all workers compensation claims justified a "multiplier" in representing claimants generally, regardless of the circumstances in an individual case. The court disagreed and held:

"The statute does not support a general `multiplier' for the statistical risk, but it does not foreclose a court from allowing a fee exceeding the attorney's usual hourly rate when the court finds that, in the specific case, success is sufficiently in doubt and the risk that the services will go uncompensated is so high that a higher attorney fee is reasonable."
Id.

In Griffin v. Tri-Met, 112 Or App 575, 584-85, 831 P2d 42 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 318 Or 500, 870 P2d 808 (1994), the trial court had awarded plaintiff attorney fees at twice counsel's standard rate. Tri-Met, the defendant, argued that that award was in error and relied on federal cases where use of a "multiplier" was at issue. On appeal, we stated: "Most of that reported litigation is unhelpful and the formulas used are unduly cumbersome. Instead, we continue to review the reasonableness of attorney fee awards by using the [traditional] factors * * *." We then examined the circumstances of the case: (1) there were a limited number of attorneys willing and able to take on complex, controversial, and high risk employment cases like the one at issue; (2) the evidence showed that the plaintiffs had experienced difficulty in obtaining qualified counsel; and (3) the evidence also showed that counsel who successfully undertook such cases for a contingency fee were generally compensated at rates greatly exceeding standard billing rates for general legal services. Thus, we concluded "that there was substantial evidence supporting the attorney fees award and [held] that, under the circumstances of [the] case, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees at twice counsel's standard rate." Id.

In Dockins II, the petitioners requested an attorney fee award for appellate work done in Dockins v. State Farm Ins. Co., 329 Or 20, 985 P2d 796 (1999) (Dockins I). They explained that request as follows:

"For each lawyer and legal assistant who worked on petitioners' appeal, petitioners have multiplied the number of hours they billed by a `reasonable hourly rate,' which is based on the respective lawyer's or assistant's standard rate for the work at issue. When the total fees for each lawyer and legal assistant are added, the result is the amount requested."
330 Or at 4 (footnote omitted). The "reasonable hourly rate" represented the petitioners' attorneys' standard rates multiplied by a factor that they stated represented the increased risk inherent in taking a case on a contingent fee basis. Id. at 4 n 3. The use of that factor was not objected to by the respondent, although the respondent did object to the reasonableness of the petitioners' underlying standard rates. Id. at 8, 8 n 10. The court was not persuaded by the respondent's objection and the awarded the petitioners the fees as they had been requested. Id. at 8-9.

Most recently, in Strunk v. PERB, 341 Or 175, 179, 139 P3d 956 (2006) (Strunk II), attorneys for public employees who had successfully challenged various statutory enactments revising the terms of the employees' pension plans petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for attorney fees and costs related to the litigation that had culminated in Strunk v. PERB, 338 Or 145, 108 P3d 1058 (2005) (Strunk I). Strunk I was before the Oregon Supreme Court on six original jurisdiction petitions; it was not a case that had come to the court on appeal. 338 Or at 150. The court in Strunk II held that the petitioners' attorneys were entitled to" an award of reasonable fees" under the equitable common fund doctrine and referred the matter to a special master for findings and recommendations with respect to the fees to be awarded. 341 Or at 184-85.

In Strunk III, the court reviewed the findings and recommendations of the special master, considered the objections and responses made by the parties, and ultimately determined the "reasonable attorney fees and costs" that should be awarded. 343 Or at 247. One of the issues considered by the court in Strunk III was the respondents' assertion that "the special master erred in awarding the fee multipliers requested by petitioners' lawyers in this case." Id. at 245. The petitioners' attorneys had requested respective multipliers of 1.5 and 2.0. Id. at 233. The respondents argued that, under the common fund doctrine, "such multipliers are generally appropriate only in the face of `exceptional success.'" Id. at 245. They contended that, because the petitioners failed to prevail on all of their claims in Strunk I, they had failed to achieve "exceptional success." Id.

The court disagreed and recognized that, in common fund cases, the preserved fund itself was a primary measure of success—the preserved fund at issue in the case exceeded $1 billion. In addition, the court noted that other factors—such as the difficulty and complexity in the case, the value of the interests at stake, and the skill and professional standing of the lawyers involved—also supported an enhancement of fees. The court therefore allowed the fee awards to be enhanced by applying the respective multipliers requested by the petitioners' lawyers. Id. at 246.

Based on the above case law, it is apparent that an award of "reasonable" attorney fees does not preclude the use of a multiplier or other fee enhancement for (1) work done at trial (Griffin); (2) work done before an appellate court sitting pursuant to its original jurisdiction (Strunk III); or (3) work done on appeal (Dockins II). Such an enhancement may be applied at the beginning of the calculation process by increasing counsel's standard or basic hourly rate to a "reasonable hourly rate" for the work done given the nature of the case, as occurred in Dockins II, or the enhancement may be applied later in the calculation process by increasing a lodestar amount of fees, as occurred in Strunk III.

Regardless of the arithmetic used, what remains constant are the factors that a court will consider in determining whether a fee enhancement should be applied in calculating a reasonable fee award. Those criteria are set out ORS 20.075(2). The factors relevant to this case are: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to properly perform the legal service; (2) the amount involved in the controversy and the results obtained; (3) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney performing the service; and (4) whether the fee of the attorney is contingent. We construe the last of those circumstances to include consideration of the risks undertaken by the attorney in litigating the case.

Several circumstances support an enhanced award for plaintiffs' fee-shifting claims in this case. First, and primarily, because this case remained a "no offer" case throughout the pendency of the appeal—i.e., a case where Farmers did not attempt to settle the dispute and made no tender to the class—class counsel continued to face a very significant risk that they would be left uncompensated given the contingent nature of their right to attorney fees. Second, this case presented novel and difficult questions in the context of a complex and large class action litigation. That factor is of less importance in the enhanced fee analysis because the complexity of the case is already accounted for in the number of hours spent in defending the appeal. Third, class counsel on appeal preserved in whole plaintiffs' award of compensatory damages and interest. Thus, we hold that plaintiffs are entitled to an enhanced fee award on their fee-shifting claims.

We next determine what that enhanced fee award should be. Plaintiffs have argued that we should apply a multiplier of 2.25 because that multiplier was used to enhance their fees for work done at trial. Farmers, on the other hand, urges us to evaluate the overall reasonableness of the award and asserts that the use of the multiplier requested results in astronomically unreasonable fees.

We do not agree with plaintiffs that a multiplier of 2.25 is appropriate simply because that multiplier was used by the trial court in awarding fees for the work done at trial. Appellate work is not identical to trial work. As the prevailing party at trial and the respondent on appeal, plaintiffs were entitled to certain favorable standards of review. The prosecution of the case at trial was more risky than the defense of the judgments on appeal. In addition, plaintiffs' efforts in arguing from a closed record on appeal cannot be equated with their efforts in creating that record at trial.

In Strunk III, the court approved the use of multipliers of 1.5 and 2.0 for work done in the Strunk I litigation. 343 Or at 233, 246. As noted above, those enhancements resulted from consideration of the result achieved, the difficulty and complexity of the issues involved, the value of the interests at stake, and the skill and professional standing of the lawyers involved. Id. at 246. Because some of those same factors support an enhancement in this case, we conclude that a similar enhancement factor is appropriate. In choosing an enhancement factor, we are sensitive to the declarations of class counsel regarding their standard billing rates as compared to the rates of their peers. Plaintiffs' lead attorney notes that class counsel's standard billing rates in this case are below the rates of many attorneys of similar training, experience, and skill. Specifically, the rates for plaintiffs' attorneys range from $200 to $400 per hour. Plaintiffs' lead attorney notes that standard billing rates of his peers can range from $450 to $590 per hour.

The ORS 20.075(2) factors in this case, however, suggest a lower multiplier than the one allowed in Strunk III. Strunk III involved the recovery of a substantially greater sum of money for the plaintiffs, the creation of a new record before the special master, and issues that were somewhat more complex than this case. For those reasons, we hold that an enhancement factor of 1.6 is appropriate for the appellate work done in this case. Thus, plaintiffs' enhanced lodestar amounts to $532,528 in fees.

E. Costs and Expenses
Plaintiffs request additional costs and expenses that are not included in their hourly rates. Included in their cost and expense request were unpaid invoices for class action administration services since November 23, 2005, in the amount of $23,526.50, as well as future expenses for class administration services in the amount of $62,836. In Willamette Prod. Credit v. Borg-Warner Acceptance, 75 Or App 154, 159, 706 P2d 577 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 477 (1986), we stated:

"In setting a reasonable attorney fee for the prevailing party, it is appropriate for the court to take into consideration the actual billing practices of the party's attorney. Traditionally, courts simply have determined fees based on the hourly charge for the attorney working on the case with the assumption that the hourly rate was set to recoup overhead and realize a profit. Modern electric accounting methods allow a more specialized billing for attorney fees. Courts should recognize the reality of modern legal business practices and include expenses specially billed to the client in the attorney fees award when they are properly documented and are reasonable."
We therefore will partially allow plaintiffs' request for costs and expenses as part of their attorney fees award in the amount of $9,941. We deny plaintiffs' requested costs and expenses in the amount of $86,362, the extent to which they relate to class administration. As with the hours related to class administration, the class must seek a supplemental judgment in the trial court for those expenses.

II. COMMON FUND AWARD
Plaintiffs also request an increase in the amount of the allocation to class counsel from the punitive damages recovery under the equitable common fund doctrine. They assert that this common fund award would compensate class counsel for their efforts in defending on appeal the award on plaintiffs' fraud claim and the punitive damages recovery. Plaintiffs request that we enhance such a common fund award by a factor of 2.25, for the same reasons that support enhancement of their fee-shifting award.

Farmers objects to plaintiffs' request for a common fund award. Farmers argues that it should be denied because class counsel's effort on appeal did not preserve the punitive damages recovery in its entirety. Rather, the recovery was reduced on appeal by more than half.

Plaintiffs respond that they clearly "preserved" a common fund on appeal. They note that Farmers sought to eliminate the fund entirely or, in the alternative, to reduce the fund to an amount equal to the compensatory damages recovery. Instead, both challenges were rejected in Strawn II and a fund four times the amount of the compensatory damages was preserved.

Whether plaintiffs here are entitled to attorney fees on appeal under the equitable common fund doctrine where their class counsel partially preserved a fund after its creation at trial is a question of first impression. The common fund doctrine under Oregon law was discussed in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Clinton, 267 Or 653, 657, 518 P2d 645 (1974), where the court recognized:" It is * * * a well-established rule in Oregon that an attorney whose efforts result in the recovery of a fund payable to various persons is entitled to payment of reasonable attorney fees from that fund." More recently, in Strunk II, the court concisely summarized the principles supporting the common fund doctrine. The court stated:

"Under the common fund doctrine, plaintiffs whose legal efforts create, discover, increase, or preserve a fund of money to which others also have a claim, may recover the costs of litigation, including their attorney fees, from the created or preserved fund. As commentators have noted, the doctrine is primarily `employed to realize the broadly defined purpose of recapturing unjust enrichment.' In other words, the doctrine is used to spread litigation expenses among all beneficiaries of a preserved fund so that litigant-beneficiaries are not required to bear the entire financial burden of the litigation while inactive beneficiaries receive the benefits at no cost."
341 Or at 181 (citation omitted).

Although Oregon courts have not spoken on the issue of when a party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under the common fund doctrine where the fund is created below and preserved on appeal, other courts have addressed the issue. The Washington Supreme Court in Bowles v. Wash. Dept. of Ret. Systems, 121 Wash 2d 52, 75, 847 P2d 440 (1993), declined to award such fees. In that case, a class action, the plaintiffs' attorneys requested attorney fees for their work on appeal under the common fund doctrine. The court stated:

"Under the percentage of recovery approach, the attorneys are to be compensated according to the size of the judgment recovered, not the actual hours expended. The plaintiffs have not increased the size of their recovery on appeal, thus we have no basis to increase their fees."
Id. Similarly, in Okeson v. City of Seattle, 130 Wash App 814, 828, 125 P3d 172 (2005), the plaintiff asked for attorney fees on appeal under the common fund doctrine. There too, the court denied the request and relied on the reasoning in Bowles. The court declined to award additional fees from the common fund because the trial court had awarded attorney fees on a "percentage of recovery" basis and the plaintiff had not increased the size of the recovery on appeal. Id. We find that reasoning helpful, and it informs our analysis below.

At this point, it is worth noting that, in the context of fee awards made under the common fund doctrine, concerns arise that (1) class counsel may be acting in conflict with the interests of the class in requesting an award from the recovered or preserved fund and (2) the parties may lack adversity where the prevailing party's award comes from a fixed fund and is not separately taxed on the opposing party. The Alaska Supreme Court most recently recognized these dual concerns in State Dept. of Health v. Okuley, 214 P3d 247 (Alaska 2009). There, the court stated:

"We have recognized the `potential lack of adversity when class counsel asks the trial court to impose fees on the benefitted class members under the common fund doctrine.' Because of this potential lack of adversity, as well as the potential for conflicts of interest between the class and class counsel, we have explained that `[c]ourts should * * * closely scrutinize applications for attorney's fees from a fixed fund.'"
Id. at 252 (footnotes omitted). Because those same dual concerns are present here, we likewise closely scrutinize plaintiffs' request for additional fees from the punitive damages recovery.

We begin our scrutiny of plaintiffs' request by examining the award of attorney fees below. The initial opinion and order of the trial court regarding attorney fees indicates that the court initially awarded class counsel attorney fees for work done at trial on a percentage of recovery basis. Specifically, the court awarded class counsel 20 percent of the $8 million punitive damages recovery, amounting to $1.6 million, and 38 percent of the nonpunitive damages recovery, amounting to $1.575 million. The trial court, in explaining the total award of $3.175 million, also stated: "Viewed from another perspective, this award is essentially equivalent to the attorneys receiving the entire Fee-Shifting Award of $2,670,000 plus another $505,000 from the common fund for a total of $3,175,000."

Subsequently, the trial court entered an order regarding the reallocation of punitive damages. That subsequent order, in part, modified the initial opinion and order regarding attorney fees. First, the trial court vacated the last two pages of its initial opinion that had determined the specific percentages—20 percent and 38 percent—of the punitive damages and nonpunitive damages recoveries to be awarded as fees. Second, it ordered that class counsel was to receive the entire statutory fee award of $2,670,000. Third, it ordered that, from the $3,200,000 in punitive damages available to the prevailing party, class counsel was to receive $505,000 in addition to the statutory fee award.

Were we to construe the award of attorney fees made by the trial court as a fee award made on a percentage of recovery basis, we would decline to award plaintiffs an additional award from the punitive damages recovery because plaintiffs have not increased their punitive damages recovery on appeal. However, given the procedural history of the trial court's attorney fee award, we conclude that the trial court's award was not based on a percentage of the recovered punitive damages. We conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees for preserving a significant portion of the punitive damages common fund. The amount of fees incurred, 11 percent of the fees calculated earlier for the fee-shifting award, is $41,136. Given the reduction in the amount of allowed punitive damages as a result of the appeal, and the lack of complexity of the legal issues involved, we decline to enhance those fees under ORS 20.075(2)(a) and (d).

III. INCENTIVE AWARD
Plaintiffs have also requested that an incentive award of $5,000 be made to the class representative, Strawn. Plaintiffs argue that an incentive award of this type is usually viewed as an extension of the common fund doctrine and has been described as a litigation expense.Plaintiffs propose that the award be made from the interest accrued on the compensatory damages portion of the underlying judgment. Plaintiffs argue that Strawn should receive such an incentive award because he (1) participated in numerous status conferences, meetings, and strategy sessions regarding the appeal over the four years the case has been pending on appeal; (2) attended the oral arguments on behalf of the class members; (3) was directly involved in making significant decisions affecting the interests of class members; and (4) remained exposed to substantial personal financial risk for Farmers' appellate costs and disbursements if the class had not prevailed on the appeal. Plaintiffs also contend that, although Strawn did not agree to serve as class representative for the purpose of receiving an incentive award, he is nonetheless entitled to such an award for his time, effort, and personal risk.

Farmers objects to plaintiffs' request for an incentive award on the ground that there is no authority in Oregon for providing Strawn with such an award. Further, Farmers argues that, even if there were a basis for such an award in the abstract, plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence, such as a record of the amount of time that Strawn spent on the appeal, to support allowing an award in this case. Farmers contends that inferences drawn from class counsel's billing records show that class counsel communicated with Strawn only briefly about the appeal process and that there is no evidence that his participation was at all necessary to the appeal.

Plaintiffs respond that an incentive award was allowed at trial and that Farmers did not challenge that award in Strawn II. Plaintiffs state that incentive awards have been made in numerous class actions and that the lack of Oregon case law authorizing such awards is explained by the fact that no other class actions have been fully litigated in Oregon state court. Lastly, plaintiffs contend that Farmers "speciously denigrates risk of a judgment against * * * Strawn personally for Farmers' appellate costs, as well as Farmers' trial costs, had the judgment been reversed."

It is correct that Oregon case law has not addressed the circumstances in which an incentive award may be granted to a class representative. And, the issue presented here—whether an incentive award may be granted to the class representative following an appeal in which the class prevails, as opposed to following a trial or settlement in which the class prevails—is specifically an unanswered question. For helpful guidance on those issues, we turn to how other courts have addressed incentive awards.

The Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir 2009) (emphasis omitted), summed up the circumstances in support of granting an incentive award as follows:

"Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases. See 4 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 11:38 (4th ed. 2008); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1303 (2006) (finding twenty-eight percent of settled class actions between 1993 and 2002 included an incentive award to class representatives). Such awards are discretionary, see In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000), and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general. Awards are generally sought after a settlement or verdict has been achieved."
In addition, the Seventh Circuit, in matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F2d 566, 571 (7th Cir 1992), addressed the rationale behind incentive awards by stating that, "[s]ince without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit could be thought the equivalent of the lawyers' nonlegal but essential case-specific expenses, such as long-distance phone calls, which are reimbursable."

Bearing in mind that understanding of the purposes of incentive awards, we now decline to grant such an incentive award to class representative Strawn in this case. First, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez, incentive awards are generally sought—and thus awarded—after a settlement or verdict has been achieved in the class's favor. We therefore question the propriety of granting plaintiffs' request for an incentive award following an appellate judgment in the class's favor. Second, even if we were to assume that the common fund doctrine would authorize such an incentive award in the abstract following an appellate judgment, we agree with Farmers that plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to support their requested award in this case. Besides the bare assertions in the fee petition regarding Strawn's participation in the appeal, class counsel's billing records indicate that, at most, only 23.8 hours of their efforts may have involved consultation with Strawn and his attendance at oral argument. Furthermore, it is far from evident that any degree of participation by Strawn was necessary to the appeal, unlike the responsibilities of the class representative during the trial phase of the litigation. For those reasons, we decline to award Strawn the requested incentive award.

IV. SUPPLEMENTAL FEES AWARD
Lastly, plaintiffs have submitted a supplemental petition for an additional award of $32,597.48, itemized as $32,332.50 in fees and $264.98 in costs and expenses. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to fees for the time and effort that they have spent litigating their initial fee petition—so called "fees on fees"—and they cite Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk, 219 Or App 16, 42-43, 181 P3d 773, rev den, 345 Or 158 (2008), and Emerald PUD v. Pacificorp, 104 Or App 504, 507, 801 P2d 141 (1990), rev den, 311 Or 222 (1991) as precedent for such an award. Plaintiffs argue that they have amassed a combined lodestar amount of $14,370 in fees as part of the fee application and litigation process, $2,590.50 of which represents additional class administration time. Plaintiffs have requested that we enhance their supplemental fees by a factor of 2.25.

Farmers objects to the supplemental petition and argues that plaintiffs are not entitled to a multiplier of 2.25 for the reasons expressed in its objections to the fee-shifting award. Lastly, Farmers suggests that, when ruling on the supplemental petition, we should consider "the overstatement and duplication of fees" in plaintiffs' initial petition.

As an initial matter, we note that the cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their supplemental petition themselves rely on ORCP 68 as the authority for "fees on fees." In those cases, we reasoned that the process of recovering fees was properly considered part of the "prosecution of an action" for purposes of a fee petition under ORCP 68. Crandon Capital Partners, 219 Or App at 42-43 (quoting Johnson v. Jeppe, 77 Or App 685, 688, 713 P2d 1090 (1986)); Emerald PUD, 104 Or App at 507 (also quoting Johnson). Thus, the precedent cited by plaintiffs, which addresses "fees on fees" at the trial level, is not directly applicable in determining their supplemental fee request on appeal. Authority for such fees must be found elsewhere.

Here, plaintiffs' supplemental fee request is based on ORS 742.061(1), which provides that "a reasonable amount * * * as attorney fees shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action and any appeal thereon." The question we are therefore presented with is whether the process of recovering fees for appellate work may properly be considered part of the "appeal" for purpose of a fee petition authorized by ORS 742.061(1). We now hold that such "fees on fees" are available because the process of litigating the fee petition for appellate work is properly considered part of the appeal.

We therefore allow plaintiffs' supplemental petition for fees in part, in the amount of $11,777. We deny the request for fees attributable to class administration time; plaintiffs must instead seek a supplemental judgment in the trial court for that time. We also decline to enhance plaintiffs' fees for the relatively routine work of litigating a fee petition. Lastly, we allow plaintiffs' supplemental request for costs and expenses not included in their hourly rates in the amount of $265.

Petitions for attorney fees allowed in amount of $595,647.

Source: leagle.com

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Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Consumer Reports Survey: Most Problems with Claims were with Farmer’s Insurance and Others

Many people don’t have reliable insurance for their home. That’s the finding of a Consumer Reports National Research Center survey on insuring your home. The problems included delayed payments, payouts that were smaller-than expected, and some claims that were denied entirely.

Those who reported the most problems with claims were with—Farmer’s Insurance, Allstate, and Traveler’s—all major insurance carriers.

And Consumer Reports finds many insurance companies are cutting back coverage. Some are imposing high deductibles for windstorm damage. You might not be covered any longer for mold or dog bites.

Most important is checking what coverage you’ll have if your house is destroyed. Consumer Reports says Insurers are cutting back here, too. “Guaranteed replacement cost coverage,“ which pays the total bill to rebuild regardless of the price, is very hard to get, and where it’s available it’s very expensive.

Consumer Reports recommends comparison shopping for insurance every five years. Some good sites—netquote.com and insweb.com.


And to be sure you’re protected in the future, check that the policy includes adjustments for inflation.

Consumer Reports says be aware that flood damage is never covered by private homeowners insurance. But you can get flood coverage through the federal government. For details, go to http://www.floodsmart.gov.

Source: tricities.com

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Monday, March 09, 2009

Farmers Insurance customers are STILL waiting for their money

$117 million in Farmers refunds for Texas policyholders has been in limbo 7 years

By TERRENCE STUTZ / The Dallas Morning News
tstutz@dallasnews.com

AUSTIN – It's becoming known as the case of the missing insurance refunds.

Back in the fall of 2002, Farmers Insurance and state regulators agreed to resolve allegations that the company had overcharged customers with a $117 million settlement that included refunds and lower rates for nearly half a million policyholders.

Shortly after the agreement was announced, it was challenged by a group of Farmers policyholders, who insisted it was a bad deal for them. Although a state judge upheld the settlement, his decision was overturned by an appeals court and then taken to the Texas Supreme Court – which sent the legal dispute back down for further deliberations.

And so the case sits unresolved – going on seven years – and Farmers customers are still waiting for their money.

"Farmers has worked closely with the Texas Department of Insurance and remained ready to implement the agreed-on settlement for several years," said Michelle Levy, a spokeswoman for Farmers in Texas. "We're ready to take action, but there's nothing we can do until the courts have decided this."


'No longer viable'

Joe Longley, attorney for the Farmers policyholders, said the amount is a slap at policyholders.

"The settlement amount was a fraction of what Farmers took from their customers in Texas and what they are continuing to take. Refunds should be as much as 10 times" the $117 million settlement, he insisted.

The case was sent back to the 3rd Texas Court of Appeals in Austin in April 2007 and has been sitting there since.

Longley said he believes the case should be sent back to trial court because all the deadlines and conditions of the original settlement have long passed.

For a lot of reasons, he said, the settlement is "no longer viable" and must be redone.

The attorney general's office, meanwhile, is trying to have the settlement certified as a class action representing all Farmers customers in the state. Such a certification could invalidate other claims against the company.


Mold beginnings

The agreement came after the company had threatened to pull out of the Texas home insurance market because of massive mold losses. Company officials also were stinging from repeated attacks by Gov. Rick Perry, who made Farmers his favorite target in his 2002 race for governor.

Perry's appointed insurance commissioner at the time, Jose Montemayor, hammered out the agreement with Farmers, apparently without consulting the governor, who was unhappy with the terms.

In the years since, Farmers has stayed on the good side of the insurance department, even winning approval from current Commissioner Mike Geeslin last month to increase rates by double-digit percentages for hundreds of thousands of customers.

Farmers is now the third-largest property insurer in Texas behind State Farm and Allstate, providing coverage to about 714,000 homeowners.

Alex Winslow of Texas Watch, a consumer group active in insurance issues, said the stalled Farmers settlement is an example of the flawed system of regulation in Texas
.

"Due process is a right for everybody, including insurance companies. But seven years is too long," Winslow said.

He compared the Farmers settlement to the "sweet deal" that Allstate received from the state last year when it settled allegations of overcharges in homeowners insurance. Allstate agreed to refund $51.6 million to its customers but was let off the hook for another $19.2 million by Geeslin, who defended the settlement as a "positive step" for ratepayers and the Texas insurance market.

Texas Watch is backing legislation filed by Democrats in the Senate and House that would require prior state approval of insurance rate increases. Currently, companies can raise rates once they notify the insurance department, which has the right to review those rates and decide whether they are justified.


Industry's stance

The insurance industry opposes prior government approval of rate increases.

"Instead of chasing the short-sighted goal of artificial price fixing, we should stick with the goal of creating a well-regulated competitive marketplace that can handle our state's tough climate efficiently and still attract companies and capital," said Beaman Floyd of the Texas Coalition for Affordable Insurance Solutions, an industry group.

Levy of Farmers emphasized that her company agreed to pay refunds to its customers and has been blocked from doing so by the class action intervention filed by Longley, an Austin attorney.

"They have left Farmers unable to implement the settlement, including retrospectively reducing rates and adjusting certain rating factors," she said.

Longley contends that the company's rates are still too high, which Levy disputed.

Longley also has a separate class action case against Farmers pending in federal court in Oklahoma City. That suit centers on management fees charged by Farmers that are reflected in premiums paid by customers in Texas and several other states.

The state's other long-running dispute over insurance rates, involving State Farm, is scheduled to go before the insurance commissioner at a March 30 hearing.

State Farm was accused by the state of overcharging customers and ordered to lower rates by 12 percent in the fall of 2003. The case has been in the courts since then, and State Farm has won some key victories. But the company is on the hook for more than $650 million in overcharges and penalty interest dating back nearly six years.

Source: dallasnews.com

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Monday, March 02, 2009

Farmers Insurance Company sued again

Lawsuits keep coming in Burlingame landslide
Shasta Kearns Moore / The Southwest Community Connection

HILLSDALE — Two more lawsuits have been filed in Multnomah County Court by the owners of the second home destroyed in the Burlingame Place landslide. The complaints totaling more than $1.7 million name Dave and Kathei Hendrickson, Farmers Insurance Company and the family’s insurance agent, Lynette Sanders.

Dr. Yuan Chou and his wife, Siukee Tong, barely escaped their home in the early morning on Oct. 8 when the house owned by the Hendricksons slid down the hillside and shoved their house off its foundation.

Both houses were destroyed — along with five other homes that were damaged — and the resulting debris has since been removed from the site.

Chou and Tong’s attorney, Jim Martin, said his clients are suing Farmers’ Insurance Company for not covering the damage to the home. Farmers’ Insurance has refused to pay, saying the policy does not cover earth movement.

But Martin argues that the damage to the home was not directly caused by earth movement.

“It is our position that the Hendricksons’ house is a flying object that landed on my client’s house, which is covered in the policy,” he said, adding that photographs show no mud on the Chou home. “So my client’s house was not damaged by land movement, it was damaged by a house falling on it.”

The family is also suing the Hendricksons for trespass, private nuisance and strict liability.

The complaint lists several remodels and landscaping projects that the Hendricksons undertook before the slide and argues that their negligence in performing these projects contributed to the landslide.

As stated in the complaint: “Upon information and belief, homes such as the Defendants’ home, do not slide down hillsides that has been there for 80 years without Defendants’ negligence in the care of their home, remodeling of their home and most importantly their landscaping as well as water management (sic).”

Farmers’ Insurance, who is also the Hendricksons’ insurer, has agreed to defend the them against this suit, according to their private attorney.

Burlingame Place remains closed
The section of Burlingame Place where Dave and Kathei Hendrickson’s home once stood will be closed until the shoulder can be rebuilt, say city officials.

Now a steep drop off to Terwilliger Boulevard, Bureau of Environmental Services spokesman Ross Caron said it would be too dangerous to open the street and risk damage to the road.

City engineer Doug Morgan said tests have shown the slope to be stable so far, but that it would be too risky to allow traffic on that section of road without the lateral support of a shoulder.

“Because of the steepness of the scarp, it’s not considered safe to reopen Burlingame,” Morgan said.

It is the responsibility of the homeowners to rebuild the shoulder, which could cost anywhere from $100,000 to $300,000, Caron estimated.

Caron said officials can eventually use city code to force the property owners to rebuild the hillside, but because the road closure is no longer impacting a major thoroughfare, they can afford to give the Hendricksons more time.

“It’s a delicate balancing act between being patient and compassionate and moving the process along quickly,” Caron said, adding city officials are trying to “treat them as they would like to be treated.”

Source swcommconnection.com

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Wednesday, February 18, 2009

Farmers Insurance sued over Hurricane Ike claim

A Jefferson County man has filed suit against Farmers Insurance Exchange, alleging he was not paid money to which he was entitled after Hurricane Ike destroyed sections of his home.

When Pete Zavala's property at 9336 FM 365 in Beaumont sustained dwelling and contents damages on Sept. 13 during Hurricane Ike, he submitted a claim to Farmers, which had insured his property, according to the complaint filed Feb. 10 in Jefferson County District Court.

Zavala requested Farmers cover the cost of repairs, the suit states.

However, Farmers improperly adjusted Zavala's claim for the repairs of his property, even though the policy provided coverage for losses, he claims.

Farmers told Zavala it would not pay the full proceeds of the policy, although demand was made for it, which constitutes a breach of the insurance contract
, the suit states.

"Defendant misrepresented to Plaintiff that the damage to the property was not in excess to the amount paid, even though the damage was caused by a covered occurrence," the suit states.

Farmers also failed to make an attempt to settle Zavala's claim in a fair manner, a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, unfair settlement practices, he claims.

The company failed to explain the reason for its offer of an inadequate settlement, another violation of the Texas Insurance Code
, according to the complaint.

Farmers failed to affirm or deny coverage of the claim within a reasonable time frame, the suit states.

It refused to fully compensate Zavala, even though it did not conduct a reasonable investigation, which constitutes another violation of the Texas Unfair Competition and Unfair Practices Act, he alleges.

Farmers breached its contract with Zavala by refusing to pay the policy, according to the suit.

Zavala is seeking three times his actual damages, plus 18 percent post-judgment interest per annum and exemplary damages.

Jason M. Byrd of Snider and Byrd in Beaumont will be representing him.

The case has been assigned to Judge Milton Shuffield, 136th District Court.

Case No. D183-249
Source: setexasrecord.com

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Saturday, February 14, 2009

Farmers Insurance is one of the 10 Worst Insurance Companies for Consumers

The American Association for Justice has recently released a report entitled The Ten Worst Insurance Companies in America. You can read it here (pdf). The Alabama Association for Justice has prepared a statement on the report, which appears below:

10 Worst Insurance Companies for Consumers Ranked; No. 1, 3, 4 and 7 Sell Policies in AL

Insurance Industry Employs "Deny, Delay, Defend" Strategy, Puts Profits Over Policyholders

MONTGOMERY - In recent years, Alabama homeowners have seen sharp increases in their insurance premiums. A new study put out by the American Association for Justice ranks the 10 worst insurance companies in the U.S. for consumers and explains the overall rise in premium costs to an industry-wide strategy of denying claims, delaying payments and defending those positions as long as possible in hopes that weary claimants will settle for less than their claim is worth.

"Nationally, we've seen insurance companies continue to put profits over the best interest of their policyholders," Gibson Vance, president of the Alabama Association for Justice (ALAJ), formerly the Alabama Trial Lawyers Association, said, adding that "in Alabama it's no different."

In Alabama, State Farm (#4 on the 10 Worst Insurance Companies List) is the leading insurer of property and casualty insurance, followed by Allstate, AIG and Farmers (#'s 1, 3 and 7 on the 10 Worst Insurance Companies List). Alabamians pay the ninth-highest average homeowners premiums in the nation, which insurers say is because of hurricane risk, but interestingly only 12 percent of the state is coastal. In addition, property and casualty insurers took in $6.6 billion in premiums from Alabama policyholders in 2006 but only paid out $3.5 billion in losses.


Thousands of court documents, materials uncovered from litigation and discovery, testimony, complaints filed with state insurance departments, SEC and FBI records, and news accounts were reviewed to compile the rankings and statistics of the study. Financial documents also revealed extravagant profits and executive compensation while policyholders' claims were routinely delayed and denied. Over the last 10 years, the property / casualty and life / health insurance industries have each enjoyed annual profits exceeding $30 billion. The insurance industry takes in over $1 trillion in premiums every year. It has $3.8 trillion in assets, more than the GDPs of all but two countries. The CEOs of the top 10 property / casualty firms earned an average of $8.9 million in 2007. The CEOs of the top 10 life / health insurance earned an average of $9.1 million. The median insurance CEO's cash compensation is $1.6 million per year, leading all industries.

"The 10 worst insurance companies that made the list did so because of their shameful treatment of policyholders. As the study shows, Allstate's Your in Good Hands' motto only applies if you don't make a claim," Vance said.

10 Worst Insurance Companies for Consumers

1. Allstate (NYSE: ALL) set the standard for insurance company greed and placing profits over policyholders. Allstate contracted with consulting giant McKinsey & Co. in the mid-1990s to systematically force consumers to accept lowball claims or face its "boxing gloves," an aggressive strategy designed to deny claims at any cost. One Allstate employee reported that supervisors told agents to lie and blame fires on arson, and in turn, were rewarded with portable fridges.

2. Unum (NYSE: UNM) - Unum's actions are even more shameful considering the type of insurance it sells: disability. Unum's behavior was epitomized when it denied the claim of a woman with multiple sclerosis for three years, stating her conditions were "self-reported," contrary to doctors' evaluations. In 2005, Unum agreed to a settlement with insurance commissioners from 48 states over their practices.

3. AIG (NYSE: AIG) - The world's biggest insurer, AIG's slogan was "we know money." AIG, described by commentators as "the new Enron," has engaged in massive corporate fraud and claims abuses. In 2006, the company paid $1.6 billion to settle a host of charges.

4. State Farm - State Farm is notorious for its deny and delay tactics, and like Allstate, hired McKinsey consultants. State Farm's true motives became apparent during Hurricane Katrina; for example, it employed multiple engineering firms until they could deny the claims of the Nguyen family of Mississippi. In April 2007, State Farm agreed to re-evaluate more than 3,000 Hurricane Katrina claims.

5. Conseco (NYSE: CNO) - Conseco sells long-term care policies, typically to the elderly. Amongst its egregious behavior, the insurer "made it so hard to make a claim that people either died or gave up," said a former Conseco-subsidiary agent. Former Conseco executives were fined when they admitted to filing misleading financial statements with regulators.

6. WellPoint (NYSE: WLP) - Health insurer WellPoint has a long history of putting profits ahead of policyholders. For instance, California fined a WellPoint subsidiary in March 2007 after an investigation revealed that the insurer routinely canceled policies of pregnant women and chronically ill patients.

7. Farmers - Swiss-owned Farmers Insurance Group consistently ranks at or near the bottom of homeowner satisfaction surveys, and for good reason. For example, Farmers had an incentive program called "Quest for Gold" that offered pizza parties to its adjusters that met low claims payments goals. Like Allstate, it also hired the McKinsey consultants.

8. UnitedHealth (NYSE: UNH) - The SEC opened an investigation into former UnitedHealth CEO William McGuire for stock backdating, which ultimately led to his ouster in 2006 and returning $620 million in stock gains and retirement compensation. Physicians have also reported that their reimbursements are so low and delayed by the company that patient health is being compromised.

9. Torchmark (NYSE: TMK) - According to Hoover's In-Depth Company Records, Torchmark's very origins were little more than a scam devised to enrich its founder, Frank Samford. Torchmark has preyed on low-income Southern residents and charged minority policyholders more than whites on burial policies.

10. Liberty Mutual - Like Allstate and State Farm, Liberty Mutual hired consulting giant McKinsey to adopt aggressive tactics. Liberty's tactics were highlighted when a New York couple's insurance was "nonrenewed" by Liberty, even though they lived 12 miles from the coast and never experienced weather-related flooding.

To see how consumers can hold the insurance industry accountable and view a full copy of the study, visit www.justice.org
Source: whnt.com

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Friday, February 13, 2009

Farmers Mutual Insurance Company Sued for Claim Denial

Montgomery County residents file hurricane insurance suit in Jefferson County
By Kelly Holleran

Two residents of The Woodlands have filed suit against Ranchers and Farmers Mutual Insurance Company and Southeast Surplus Underwriters General Agency, alleging they were not paid money to which they were entitled after Hurricane Ike destroyed sections of their home.

When Michelle Weishiemer's and David Aguilar's property at 19 Shimmer Pond Place in The Woodlands sustained roof and water damages on Sept. 13 during Hurricane Ike, they submitted a claim to Ranchers and Farmers, which had insured their property, according to the complaint filed Jan. 30 in Jefferson County District Court.

Weishiemer and Aguilar requested Ranchers and Farmers cover the cost of repairs, the suit states.

However, Ranchers and Farmers denied a portion of Weishiemer's and Aguilar's claim for the repairs of their property, even though the policy provided coverage for losses, she claims.

It denied the claim after assigning an adjuster from Southeast Surplus to adjust the claim, according to the complaint.

"Plaintiffs' claim(s) still remain unpaid and the Plaintiffs still have not been able to properly repair the Property," the suit states. "Plaintiffs cannot live in their house in its current condition. They have been forced to lease another house at their own expense because Defendants have not even properly paid Plaintiffs under their Loss of Use coverage under their policy."

Ranchers and Farmers told Reed it would not pay the full proceeds of the policy, although demand was made for it, which constitutes a breach of the insurance contract, the suit states.

"Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the damage to the Property was not covered under the Policy, even though the damage was caused by a covered occurrence," the suit states.

Ranchers and Farmers and Southeast Surplus also failed to make an attempt to settle Weishiemer's and Aguilar's claim in a fair manner, a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, unfair settlement practices, they claim.

The companies failed to explain the reason for their offer of an inadequate settlement, another violation of the Texas Insurance Code, according to the complaint.

Ranchers and Farmers and Southeast Surplus failed to affirm or deny coverage of the claim within a reasonable time frame, the suit states.

They refused to fully compensate Weishiemer and Aguilar, even though they did not conduct a reasonable investigation, which constitutes another violation of the Texas Unfair Competition and Unfair Practices Act, Weishiemer and Aguilar allege.

Ranchers and Farmers and Southeast Surplus breached their contract with Weishiemer and Aguilar by refusing to pay the policy, according to the complaint.

Ranchers and Farmers and Southeast Surplus violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act by an unreasonable delay in the investigation, adjustment and resolution of the Weishiemer's and Aguilar's claim, by their failure to give Weishiemer and Aguilar the benefit of the doubt and by their failure to pay for the proper repair of Weishiemer's and Aguilar's home, the suit states.

Ranchers and Farmers and Southeast Surplus engaged in false, misleading and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, according to the complaint.

The companies also engaged in unfair claims settlement practices, the suit states.

Weishiemer and Aguilar are seeking unspecified actual, consequential, treble, punitive and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees, costs, pre- and post-judgment interest and other relief to which they may be entitled.

Jason D. Speights of Speights Law Firm in San Antonio will be representing them.

The case has been assigned to Judge Milton Shuffield, 136th District Court.

Case No. D183-165
Source: setexasrecord.com

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Thursday, January 29, 2009

Farmers New World Life Insurance and HIV

The Spokane Spokesman-Review on Wednesday examined a case in Washington state in which an HIV-positive man was denied life insurance by Farmers New World Life Insurance. Some advocates had hoped that the discrimination case would "open doors" for people living with the virus who are denied life insurance, the Spokesman-Review reports, adding that those hopes were "dashed" by a ruling that said Gerald Hebert -- an employee with the state's Human Rights Commission who issued a complaint with the insurance commissioner's office in 2006 -- was not illegally discriminated against because of his HIV-positive status.

Although the issue of HIV/AIDS-related discrimination is not new, advocates said this case illustrates that the insurance industry fails to recognize the increased life expectancies of HIV-positive people because of advances in antiretroviral therapy. Sid Wolinsky of the San Francisco not-for-profit legal center Disability Rights Advocates said that the "problem" with insurance companies is that they "routinely use grossly outdated statistical material," rarely keep their own data and rely on manuals reinsurance companies provide. Wolinsky said, "That is not to say there is not an increased mortality or morbidity risk for somebody with HIV than for somebody without it. But the risk is such that it can be covered."

According to the Spokesman-Review, insurance companies can deny coverage to a person only if there is sound statistical data that show the person is too risky to insure. Documents show that the Washington state Insurance Commissioner's Office, which led the investigation, had difficulty obtaining such information from Farmers. The Spokesman-Review reports that a Swiss study of people living with HIV found that "successfully treated HIV-positive and hepatitis C-negative patients have a short-term mortality as low as or lower than that of patients with cancer who have been successfully treated -- a group that is able to obtain life insurance."

Marc Brenman -- former executive director of the state's Human Rights Commission -- said that there is reason to believe Farmers routinely violated a state law by denying insurance to people living with HIV. Brenman said that there is "an entire class of people who are not able to purchase life insurance at any price, and it is entirely and absolutely wrong." Farmers denies the claim and said that it applies underwriting grants fairly and consistently (Graman, Spokane Spokesman-Review, 1/28).

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Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Farmers Insurance: “The way the policies are written are really deceitful,”

Bill’s Automotive update
Just down the hill from the slide, Bill King continues sorting through mud-covered debris at the site of his auto shop, which was destroyed by the landslide. King also hopes to find another location to continue his business.

A relief account at US Bank has accumulated approximately $525, which King said will help his efforts. King also continues to battle his insurance company, Farmers Insurance, over his losses.

King reported the company paid $30,000 to cover the cost of the vehicles damaged in the slide, but it will not cover other costs, including the six lease payments remaining on his equipment. King said he read through his policy, which specifically excluded landslides, but that it was buried in a “textbook” of endorsements.

“The way the policies are written are really deceitful,” King said. “It’s all in code.”

King, who rented the building for his business, is eligible for property tax relief from Clackamas County through an “Act of God” provision covering the storm that caused the landslide. The provision, which is available to all property owners and includes business and personal property, allows for a reduction in taxes based on the scope of the damage and the date the damage occurred.

Those who sustained property damage may receive a prorated portion of their property taxes, which is valued as of Jan. 1 of each year — the day before the landslide. The filing deadline for tax relief is the end of the tax year in which the destruction occurred or 60 days after the date the property was damaged or destroyed, whichever is later.

Source: sandypost.com

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Thursday, January 22, 2009

Farmers Insurance had the most complaints lodged against it during the storm season

It happens like clockwork.

Lately, it seems like every winter a storm blasts through Washington state bringing with it rain, wind and property damage.

If your roof gets swept up in hurricane-force winds, if a tree falls on your garage, are you covered by insurance?

Sometimes homeowners think they’re fully covered for things such as roofs, when they’re only really covered on the depreciated value of the roof, a decade after it was put on. Those can be hard, frustrating lessons, and sometimes, when an argument between homeowners and insurance companies gets heated, the state becomes involved.

In the last few years, countless people on the Twin Harbors have received a crash course in homeowners insurance coverage. Experiences have varied widely, but many have been frustrated by it.

The Daily World recently analyzed complaints filed with the state Insurance Commissioner’s Office resulting from a December 2006 storm and the big December 2007 storm.

A complaint registered with the Insurance Commissioner doesn’t mean an insurance company has done anything wrong, said Eric Mark, the public records manager for the state office. In fact, according to state investigator records obtained by The Daily World, most times insurance companies have not broken any regulatory rules at all.

But while many times rules may not have been broken, some policy holders feel so frustrated they still contact the Insurance Commissioner.

By the numbers

Statewide, Farmers Insurance had the most complaints lodged against it during the storm season, tying Allstate Insurance after the December 2006 storm with 11 complaints and garnering another 11 complaints from the December 2007 storm, for a total of 22.

Allstate had a total of 15 complaints from both storms. Farmers-owned Foremost Insurance had the third-most complaints filed, receiving 10 complaints from both storms.

Farmers’ top status for complaints received by the Insurance Commissioner is actually on par with the complaints the company gets year-round. For homeowner policies in 2007, Washington residents filed 101 complaints against Farmers, which had about a 13 percent market share of the state, the state agency says. In 2006, there were 72 complaints filed against Farmers. In both years, no other insurance company garnered as many complaints.

That compares, for instance, with State Farm Insurance, which had 55 complaints in 2007 and nearly 20 percent of the state’s market share — the highest share of any company. It registered only 43 complaints in 2006. During the past two December storms, just four complaints were filed against State Farm.

A spokesman for Farmers did not return phone calls seeking comment.

It was Farmers that took the Insurance Commissioner’s Office to Thurston County Superior Court in November over a couple of the case files The Daily World sought to review in a public records request for this story. Farmers initially didn’t want the state to release any of the information contained in two of the files, citing “trademark” protections. But during the court hearings, the company eventually changed its point of view and with a judge’s blessing released redacted information.

Mark, the public records manager for the Insurance Commissioner’s Office, says it’s been a couple of years since an insurance company has contested a public records request in court.

Some complaints

Complaints range from frustrated homeowners to cases that may be bound for court.

Sharon Longwith — one of the few people who allowed The Daily World to print her name for this story — said she thought she had a rock-solid policy that would have covered her house in all kinds of situations.

But she told The Daily World that Farmers partially denied a claim she and her husband filed with the insurance company following the December 2007 storm.


The storm had soaked the south side of her home, but she says the company wouldn’t pay for all of the damage “because the storm didn’t put a hole in my wall.”

That’s why she filed a complaint with the insurance commissioner’s office. When that didn’t help, she turned to FEMA for help. And when FEMA turned her down, she was able to find some financial assistance through the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s rural development program.

“Without the U.S. Department of Agriculture, I think we’d still have damage today,” Longwith said last month. “They gave us the money to hire a contractor, to repair the damage and are truly unsung heroes. I don’t think many people know they can get help through them.”

But some folks aren’t as lucky as Longwith.

A Rochester couple filed a complaint against Farmers following the December 2007 storm because the water around their home had risen to such a level that they actually had to be evacuated. The couple is named in the state documents but asked The Daily World not to identify them.

In their initial complaint letter to Insurance Commissioner Mike Kreidler, they wrote, “The flood water destroyed our insulation and heating ductwork completely, the skirting is waterlogged and will also need to be replaced. Our home has a cold-dampness inside and we have been using space heaters 24/7 to keep the cold/damp air at bay. This has resulted in a high electric bill; $191.00 for December. You can see the water in the floor ducts throughout the house.”

Their complaint wasn’t that Farmers wouldn’t cover their damage, but that the company was taking too long to respond. In the end, according to the Insurance Commissioner’s Office, the homeowners decided to get FEMA involved.

In Raymond, a homeowner called his insurance company, Foremost, while his power was still out, following the wind blasts of the 2007 storm. He wanted to set up a time for an adjuster right away because his home was soaked from so much rain.

“I asked if I could remove the closet carpet because of rain saturation and was told NOT to touch anything until the adjuster saw the damage,” wrote the complainant, whose name has been redacted from the state report. “I told her that the water will move through the area and she said this was ‘Due Process’ and that I needed to adhere to it.”

He was also concerned because when an adjuster did come out, the adjuster allegedly didn’t look under tarps on the roof or do an adequate inspection, resulting in a lower-than-expected settlement offer, according to the complaint.

Even though the state investigator didn’t find that the company did anything wrong, just the mere fact that the Raymond man complained seemed to speed up the process for him, according to the documents obtained by The Daily World.

Then there’s another incident in Raymond, which may very well end up in court.

A Raymond man, whose name has also been redacted from the state reports, complained to the Insurance Commissioner’s Office because Safeco Insurance had denied his claim. During the December 2007 storm, the rain had saturated the ground around his home to the point that the foundation shifted.

Safeco claimed that the foundation shift was caused by an “earth movement, meaning the sinking, rising, shifting, expanding or contracting of earth, all whether combined with water or not,” and so the claim isn’t covered under the homeowner’s policy.

According to notes from the state investigator, “Safeco seems to think that if 50 percent or more of the damage wasn’t caused by the wind, they won’t pay on anything.”

Amid the documents released to The Daily World is a report filed by an expert hired by the insurance company saying all the damage was caused by the “earth movement” while the Raymond man has documents on file from an engineer that indicate that when the ground was softened, it was the wind that blew the foundation off, which should then be covered.

The state investigator said there was nothing she could do and recommended the man contact an attorney, which she later noted he did.

Know your policy

But the term “earth movement” is one that should be remembered by everyone seeking insurance, according to Hoquiam Mayor Jack Durney, who also owns Durney Insurance in Hoquiam, and was willing to review some of the Insurance Commissioner files with The Daily World.

“There isn’t a regular home policy out there that covers earth movements,” said Durney.

And those who are concerned that their foundation may slip because of soggy ground may just be out of luck.

“A lot of the Harbor here is built on fill,” Durney said. “And there are places where earthquake insurance coverage just won’t take.” Or, if a policy can be found, it won’t ever be affordable because of the high risk factor.

Typical homeowner’s insurance won’t cover flood damage, either, Durney notes. A number of the complaints filed with the Insurance Commissioner’s Office had to do with flooding, but nearly every time the state had to reject the complaint because there was no flood policy.

Homeowners concerned enough about flooding need to buy such a policy through the National Flood Insurance Program, independent from any other policy, Durney said.

Durney also found that one of the biggest complaints he hears is the difference between a policy that covers the “actual cash value” of, say, a damaged roof, compared to a policy that will fully cover the cost to repair a roof.

“There’s such a huge difference both in the premium the homeowner pays and the amount of coverage that results,” Durney said.

With “actual cash value,” the homeowner will only be compensated with what the roof is worth in today’s dollars. That’s often thousands of dollars less than what it will cost to get a new roof.

The homeowner is stuck with the bill for whatever the difference is. Don’t like that idea? Durney says take a look at your policy to make sure it’s not there and contact your insurance agent to change policies right away.

“I would be more inclined to say that although there can be a big difference in premium, it is well worth it because the ‘replacement’ policy will do just that — hire a contractor to repair or replace the damaged part of the home. ‘actual cash value’ is much like the collision coverage you have on a car in that depreciation is taken into consideration. So, if you have a roof that is in bad repair and is old, the insurance company will only pay you the depreciated value — much like an old car that you wreck.”

Planning on renovating the home? A new homeowner’s policy may be your best bet, Durney also advises.

“The trick with insurance policies is making sure what you want is in your policy before a disaster happens,” Durney said. “That means asking lots of questions and having an agent or someone who can actually give you answers.”

That way insurance holders won’t be on their last legs with no one else to go to but the Insurance Commissioner — or an attorney.

Want to see more complaints or file one? Visit https://fortress.wa.gov/oic/complaints/

Got an Insurance Commissioner question? Call the Insurance Consumer Hotline at 1-800-562-6900.

By The Numbers

Complaints after Dec. 2006 & 2007 storms:

Farmers 22

Allstate 15

Foremost 10

Hartford 4

Liberty Mutual 4

State Farm 4

Safeco 3

Pemcu Mutual 3

Balboa 2

Grange 2

Metropolitan Property & Casualty 2

Mutual of Encumclaw 2

USAA Casualty 2

Zurich American 2

Amco 1

American Alternative 1

American Family 1

American Federation 1

American Security 1

American States 1

Amica Mutual 1

California Casualty 1

Canfield & Associates 1

Contractors Bonding & Insurance 1

Country Mutual 1

Esurance 1

Guideone Mutual 1

Homesite 1

Lexington 1

Mt. Hawley 1

North Pacific 1

QBE 1

Standard Fire 1

Truck Insurance 1

Source: thedailyworld.com

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Friday, January 02, 2009

Video: Man Feels Burned by Farmers Insurance Group/Foremost Insurance



Feeling burned by his insurance company
December 31, 2008 - 6:40 PM

SOUTH HAVEN, Mich. (NEWSCHANNEL 3) - He wasn't burned by the flames, but a man close to a boat explosion that occurred in South Haven over the fall now says his insurance company is burning him.

The owner of the boat suffered serious burns when the boat exploded, and a woman and child inside the boat were also injured, but now another boat owner nearby on that afternoon says he's dealing with financial damage.

The boat sits in storage, but the damage from the explosion is still evident, the plexi-glass is gone, the fiberglass is cracked and the cover has melted into the foam supports.

"I didn't hear a bang or a loud noise, all I heard was a whoosh," said Steven Eberhard, recalling the Sunday in October.

Eberhard first helped the three people injured in the accident.

"She was screaming for help and I said, 'jump in the water,'" Eberhard said.

Steven then turned his attention to his 44-foot boat, which was just two boats upriver from the flames.

"All I heard people saying was 'get your boat out of there, get your boat out of there," Eberhard said.

Today, Eberhard's boat sits on blocks in a warehouse. At his home in Jackson, he showed Newschannel 3 how the costs for repairs quickly added up, he estimates the total will be close to $50,000.

Eberhard has insurance with Foremost, but he says when he contacted him he was told something that surprised him.

"I has not been determined who is at fault, and I said, 'I wasn't at fault'" said Eberhard.

Eberhard says the claims adjuster told him that conclusion could take years, and that he now has to pay the two-percent deductible, which is about $4,000.

Eberhard says his option are either to wait for Foremost Insurance to pay or to sue the owner of the boat that exploded.

"Well I don't want to sue him, gee, he's had enough problems on his own," Eberhard said. "My boat was damaged, I was hurt, I was doing a kind deed, trying to help people and how do I get repaid?"

Eberhard says that none of the other boat owners with damages have had problems with their insurance companies, and that includes the man whose boat exploded, a man Eberhard says also has a policy with Foremost.

Newschannel 3 left messages with officials at Farmers Insurance Group as well as with the Foremost Insurance Division, but did not hear back.

Source: wwmt.com

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Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Farmers Insurance Ranks Below Industry Average for Auto Claims Satisfaction

According to J.D. Power and Associates 2008 Auto Claims Satisfaction Study, Farmers Insurance ranked below the Industry Average in Customer Satisfaction.

The 2008 Auto Claims Satisfaction Study is based on 11,671 responses from auto insurance customers who filed a claim within the past 12 months. The study excludes customers who only had glass/windshield, theft/stolen vehicle, roadside assistance or bodily injury claims. The study was fielded from July to August 2008.

The study finds that implementing 10 specific service practices has a considerable impact on overall satisfaction
with the claims process. They are:
• Answering all customer questions
• Managing expectations regarding the settlement
• Expressing genuine concern
• Avoiding negotiated settlements
• Providing flexible appraisal appointments
• Returning phone calls
• Sharing information between representatives
• Providing proactive updates
• Ensuring customer is at ease with claims process
• Giving customers a time line and meeting it

For details see: J.D. Power and Associates 2008 Auto Claims Satisfaction Study

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Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Farmers Insurance Received Most Complaints for Auto and Homeowners Insurance

Oregon's Department of Consumer and Business Services Insurance Division has published the 2007 Annual Complaint Statistics, ranking major insurers based on their complaint records in six common lines of insurance: personal auto, health, homeowner, life, annuities, and long-term care.

This report ranks major insurers by their complaint records, which are based on the number of confirmed consumer complaints closed by the Insurance Division and the amount of premium dollars written by the insurers. According to DCBS, the report allows consumers to see at a glance how a company compares with its competitors; the information should help consumer to make sound insurance decisions.

During 2007, the Oregon Insurance Division closed 2,934 complaints in six common lines of insurance. The insurers listed in the report accounted for 2,275 complaints or 78 percent of all complaints in the six lines. In 2007, most complaints involved disputes about claims processing and benefits, DCBS indicated. Other complaints involved problems with the sale and servicing of insurance policies, such as cancellations, nonrenewals, and rate increases. The Insurance Division's Consumer Advocacy Unit helped recover $1.78 million in claims for consumers who contacted the office in 2007.

Of personal auto insurance companies, Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon received the most complaints in 2007, with 211 complaints of 187 confirmed. Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Co. and Oregon Automobile Insurance Co. tied for receiving zero complaints last year, the statistics indicate.

Of homeowners insurance companies, several companies -- California Casualty General Insurance Company of Oregon, North Pacific Insurance Co., Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Co., Oregon Automobiles Insurance Co. and Western Protectors Insurance Co. -- received zero complaints. Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon received the most complaints with 36 confirmed complaints.State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. received the second-highest number of complaints with 31 comfirmed complaints, followed by Allstate Insurance Co., which had 16 confirmed complaints.

To view the statistics, visit insurance.oregon.gov

Source: insurancejournal.com

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